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This study examines the effectiveness of the United States’ targeted killing
program. Specifically, do targeted killings work as an effective program for combating
global terrorism? This thesis is divided into parts. The first section provides a brief
introduction to targeted killings. The second part consists of an examination of targeted
killings as an essentially contested concept, arguing that targeted killings can be defined
in a manner consistent with the scientific enterprise. The third section contains a thorough
review of the literature on targeted killings, demonstrating that there is a dearth of works
investigating the actual effectiveness of targeted killings. The fourth portion outlines the
methodologies chosen for this endeavor – a combination of quantitative and quantitative
methodologies. The fifth part provides the descriptive and predictive results of the
statistical analyses conducted in the course of this study. It is found that the statistical
data provides mixed results concerning the effectiveness of targeted killings. The sixth
section contains the qualitative data uncovered in the authors’ research. The qualitative
information provides strong support to the view that targeted killings are an effective
method for combating terrorist groups. The final chapter consists of an analysis of the
results, thoughts on future research and methodologies, and policy recommendations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The use of targeted killings by state actors against non-state actors has become a
contentious issue in the United States‟ “War on Terror.” The debates surrounding
targeted killings appear to center around three main issues. Firstly, there are debates
concerning the normative implications that arise from the utilization of targeted killings
by states. Secondly, both international law and domestic laws play a strong role in the
debate over targeted killings. Finally, empirical questions concerning the effectiveness of
targeted killings come into play in the debate over targeted killings. Unfortunately, this
last debate seems to have been the least examined.
A Gap in the Literature
Whilst there has been a vast quantity of research produced on the subject of
targeted killings, the specific focuses of the literature published on the topic have been
unbalanced in their levels of attention. For example, whilst there is a body of research on
the historical usage of targeted killings in their research, much of the literature has
focused mainly upon the Israeli usage of targeted killings, to the neglect of other similar
programs (Ben Naftali, 2007; Cohen & Shany, 2007; David, 2003a; Gross, 2003; Kasher
& Yadlin, 2005; etc.). Furthermore, a great deal of the literature has consisted of
normative arguments for and against the utilization of targeted killings as an instrument
of state security (Stein, 2003; Hitz, 2002; Lang, 2008, etc.). In addition, a massive
volume of legal scholarship has been produced on the topic, even surpassing the number
of normative works on the topic (Ratner, 2008; Casey, 2005; Downes, 2004; Solis, 2007;
Guiora, 2004; Eickenspahr, 2003). Unfortunately, the least researched portion of the
literature has been that of empirical tests of the effectiveness of targeted killings. In
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regards to the American case in particular, there has been a particular lack of research
into the effectiveness of the program, with almost exclusive attention being placed upon
testing the effectiveness of the Israeli program. Thus, the goal of this study is to rectify
this situation by providing the first systematic examination and empirical test of the
United States‟ targeted killing program, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative
methods.
The Importance of Empirical Testing of the Efficacy of Targeted Killings
The question of whether or not targeted killings are an effective strategy for
combating terrorism is not simply a question limited to the domain of the Ivory Tower.
Indeed, the findings of such a study have inherent policy ramifications as well. Firstly, if
targeted killings were found to be ineffective, or to be positively related to an increase in
terrorist attacks, then the need for the continuance of the program would be called into
question. On the other hand, if targeted killings were found to decrease the occurrence of
terrorist attacks, and were found to inhibit the operations of a terrorist group‟s leadership,
then it would be considered imprudent to cease targeted killing operations. Secondly, an
empirical test of the effectiveness of US-conducted targeted killings would fill a gap in
the literature, and provide a new avenue for dialogue for political theorists and
international lawyers engaged in the targeted killings debates. Finally, such a study would
provide the perfect avenue for a side-by-side comparison/test of quantitative and
qualitative methodologies. Specifically, it would be interesting to examine whether said
methodologies would come to the same conclusions in their respective tests, or if
different methodologies would find different results. Furthermore, the combination of
quantitative and qualitative methods would strengthen any study‟s findings, due to their
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inherently complementary nature. Whilst statistical methods may assist with the large-n
of the study and the quest for statistical rigor, they lack the depth and detail needed for an
in-depth analysis of the inner workings of terrorist organizations. The addition of
qualitative data and analysis into the study makes up for said concerns by allowing one to
interpret the behavior of terrorist leaders, through the utilization of data from news
sources, etcetera. In summary, an empirical test of the effectiveness of targeted killings
would assist in filling a major gap in the literature, and would provide data for policy
formation to government and military officials.
Towards this goal, this study attempts to fill the abovementioned gap in the
literature through the usage of a mixed-methods research design. Both statistical and
qualitative methods are taken in hand for empirically testing the effectiveness of the
United States‟ targeted killing program from 2004 to 2009. The remainder of this chapter
outlines the form of this thesis.
Looking Ahead
Chapter 2 of this study examines targeted killings as an essentially contested
concept. The chapter demonstrates that the key point of contestation in the literature is
definitional in nature. Specifically, are “targeted killings” the same thing as political
assassinations? This chapter briefly outlines the history of the term, and demonstrates that
“targeted killings” has become an “essentially contested” concept. Through the necessary
and sufficient conditions perspective as outlined by Giovanni Sartori (1971) and William
Connolly (1974), this chapter also addresses the appraisive dimension of targeted
killings. In addition, the Family Resemblance Concept approach associated with Gary
Goertz (2006) is assessed, and found to be inapplicable in these definitional debates.

4
Finally, utilizing the necessary and sufficient conditions as outlined by Sartori (1971),
this chapter provides a definition of targeted killings which is both value neutral, and is
distinguished from the concept of political assassination.
Chapter 3 of this study consists of a comprehensive review of the four streams of
literature pertaining to targeted killings. Firstly, there are historical studies of the use of
targeted killings. Secondly, there are debates concerning the normative implications that
arise from the utilization of targeted killings by states. Thirdly, there is a plethora of work
on how international and domestic laws play a role in targeted killings. Finally, there are
empirical and methodological pieces concerning targeted killings. In conclusion, this
literature review attempts to tackle this leviathan through investigating the historical,
normative, legal, and empirical/methodological literatures on the subject.
Chapter 4 provides the research design and methodology utilized in this study.
This examines concerns related to investigating the empirical effectiveness of targeted
killings. Specifically, this focuses upon the case of the American program. This chapter
also explains the manner in which the dataset utilized in this was constructed.
Furthermore, this chapter addresses methodological concerns pertaining to gauging the
effectiveness of targeted killings by explicating the manner in which mixed-methods are
utilized in this study.
Chapter 5 presents the statistical results derived from the database of United
States conducted targeted killings produced for this study. An analysis of the results is
also provided.
Chapter 6 contains a qualitative evaluation of the United States‟ targeted killing
program. Particular attention is paid to statements made/leaked from Al-Qaeda and
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Taliban sources to locality-specific media sources.
Chapter 7 provides a comprehensive evaluation of this study‟s findings. The
results of the statistical and qualitative data are compared. Furthermore, suggestions for
future courses of research on this topic are put forth. Finally, this section provides policy
recommendations.
Conclusion
In summary, whilst a great deal of research has been produced on the topic of
targeted killings over the past decade, the scope of the literature has been unbalanced.
The overwhelming majority of works on the matter have been historical, normative, or
legal in nature. On the other hand, very little work has been done to test the effectiveness
of targeted killings. Furthermore, the empirical tests that have come forth have almost
exclusively focused upon the Israeli‟s targeted killing program. Hence, this study
attempts to fill this void in the literature through the production of a mixed-methods
research program which gauges the effectiveness of the United States‟ targeted killing
program from 2004 to 2009. In conclusion, this study‟s scope is not limited to scholarly
interest, its findings also provide important data for policymakers.
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Chapter 2: What is a Targeted Killing?
The debates surrounding the utilization of targeted killings by the US and Israeli
governments are among some of the most heated arguments between members of both
the academic and policy communities. Arguably, the key point of contestation is
definitional in nature. Specifically, are “targeted killings” the same thing as political
assassinations? The first section of this chapter demonstrates that “targeted killings” has
become an “essentially contested” concept in the current state of the literature. The
second area of the chapter takes into account concerns pertaining to the appraisive
dimension when defining targeted killings. The third section examines whether or not the
Family Resemblance Concept approach as outlined by Goertz (2006) is applicable in
these debates. The fourth portion utilizes a form of the necessary and sufficient
conditions as outlined by Sartori (1970), and demonstrates that it is possible for scholars
to arrive at a definition of targeted killings which is both value neutral and distinguishes
the aforementioned concept from political assassination. The final portion of the chapter
assesses the scientific utility of the new formulation of the concept.
An Essentially Contested Concept?
William Connolly explains that an essentially contested concept is one in which
“the concept involved is appraisive…is internally complex….and the agreed and
contested rules of application are relatively open” (emphases in original) (1974, p.10). An
examination of the literature makes it apparent that the term “targeted killings” is an
essentially contested concept. A key problem in the literature is the fact that the various
normative values held by scholars have had a strong influence in the way that they define
targeted killings. In general, there are two main debates in the literature concerning the
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definition of targeted killings. Firstly, there have been arguments over whether or not a
“targeted killing” is the same thing as a political “assassination” (Downes, 2004; Fisher,
2007; Lotrionte, 2003; Ratner, 2007; Solis, 2007). Secondly, the conceptual debates have
contested whether targeted killings are within the domain of law-enforcement or warfare,
due to conflicts over whether terrorism is a criminal act or an act of war (Gross, 2006;
Machon, 2006; Osiel, 2009; Ratner, 2007). Thus, if terrorism is a criminal act, then
targeted killings are an illegal method of law enforcement; whilst if terrorism is an act of
war, then targeted killings is simply a military tactic. As one shall see, “targeted killings”
is indeed an essentially contested concept.
There has been a strong debate concerning whether or not targeted killings mean
the same thing as political assassinations. Scholars such Frederick Hitz argue that
targeted killings are the same thing as political assassination, pointing to the US
Executive Order 12,333, which prohibits the use of assassination, as a source of support
(2002, pp. 774-777). Said order came about during the 1970s in response to the public
disclosure of the excesses of the Kennedy administration and its repeated attempts to kill
political officials such as Fidel Castro (pp. 774-777). On the other hand, scholars such as
Gary Solis argue that the aforementioned executive order does not apply to targeted
killings, since the order solely addresses the killing of government officials (2007, p. 134;
Lotrionte, 2003, p. 76). Some military scholars have argued that targeted killings may be
misinterpreted as being political assassinations due to the fact that “during an armed
conflict, self-defense is a political purpose” (Kasher and Yadlin, 2005, p. 55). Thus, there
have been a series of debates concerning whether or not there is a distinct legal difference
between political assassinations and targeted killings.
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Arguably, political assassinations and targeted killings are two different acts in an
objective legal sense. Firstly, one must take into consideration the military component of
a state as well when formulating such a concept. It is well known that it is not a concern
of law if one were to kill an active member of a state‟s military during a conflict. Since
the military is an armed entity as a whole, and its purpose is to inflict damage upon the
enemies of its state, members of a state‟s military have generally been considered
legitimate targets for elimination. Amos Guiora (2004) and Gary Solis (2007) both note
that under customary (and treaty) international law and conventions, civilians who
actively take part in hostilities are considered to be combatants. Secondly, it becomes
apparent from traditional understandings of international law that assassinations are
customarily meant to refer to the killing of heads of government and officials of the
government (David, 2003; Lotrionte, 2003).
Thus, one can extract a few key truths from the conflicting connotations. First,
assassinations have traditionally meant the killing of non-military members of the
government. Secondly, the killing of military officials of a state with which one is at war
has never been considered (in a legal sense) an assassination. Thirdly, civilians have been
considered to be combatants legally on par with military forces when they begin to take
part in hostilities. Since non-state actors are by their very nature not a part of the
government, it follows that the killing of a member would not be considered to be an
assassination in a legal sense. Even if the formerly recognized government of a state has
collapsed, under customary international law, a non-state actor could not be considered to
be a government, unless it becomes recognized as such by another state or a body such as
the United Nations. Since those whom are actively involved in hostilities lose their
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protections as civilians in such cases, it becomes apparent that they make themselves
legitimate targets for other belligerents. Furthermore, killing a member of an armed nonstate actor would legally be on par with killing a member of a state‟s military, since
members of the military do not receive any special legal protections in regards to
attempts on their lives. Thus, there is a distinct difference between assassinations and
targeted killings. Whilst assassinations pertain to the killing of non-combatant members
of a government, targeted killings refer to the killing of specific, non-government
affiliated individuals engaged in warfare.
There has been a rather robust debate concerning whether targeted killings fall in
the domain of warfare or law enforcement. Scholars such as Steven Ratner make the case
that terrorists are “quasi-civilians” and that targeted killings constitute “extrajudicial
killings” under the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (2008, p.
258). Yael Stein also implies that terrorists should be punished in a court of law (2003,
pp. 132-133). Legal scholars, such as Solis, remind us that the definition of “civilian”
under international law is not necessarily to be interpreted as meaning “noncombatant”
(2007, pp. 134-136). Guiora provides similar results, utilizing the Geneva Conventions,
explaining that terrorists are “combatants minus any insignia” (2004, p. 331). In the
Israeli case, their Supreme Court has found that civilians lose their legal protections when
they take “direct part in hostilities” under the Geneva and Hague conventions (BenNaftali & Michaeli, 2007, p. 61). Anthony Lang (2008) argues that programs such as
targeted killings are only justifiable if they are sanctioned under a collective international
system in which states would have “adjudicating responsibility” (pp. 510-511). Tamar
Meisels argues that targeted killings are a form of warfare utilized for preventing or
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disrupting future attacks (2004, p. 307). Thus, it is not a form of punishment in response
to a criminal act (p. 306). However, some argue that killing terrorist leaders is morally
permissible, but killing the leadership of rogue regimes is not (Thomas, 2005, p. 38).
Thus, it appears that the debates concerning the connotative dimensions of the concept of
targeted killings may continue without end.
In conclusion, the self-contradictory assertions found among the works in the
literature demonstrate that “targeted killings” is an essentially contested concept.
Scholars have thus far not been able to come to an agreement concerning whether or not
targeted killings constitute political assassinations. Furthermore, academics have been
unable to come to an agreement upon whether or not targeted killings are an action of law
enforcement or warfare.
The Current State of the Term
Considering the literature reviewed above, it becomes apparent that a veritable
plethora of terms have been associated with targeted killings (see Figure 1). Some have
utilized the term, “extrajudicial,” in their attempts to define targeted killings.
Furthermore, such attempts have worked to link targeted killings and law enforcement. In
regards to the appraisive dimension, there have been attempts to specify targeted killings
with the terms “perfidy,” “revenge,” “punitive,” and “disproportionality.” Many scholars
have attempted to separate targeted killings from political assassinations. Such scholars
have generally worked to regard targeted killings as a form of “warfare,” as opposed to a
matter best left to law enforcement. In regards to the appraisive dimension, scholars in
favor of targeted killings have worked to link targeted killings with the terms
“responsibility to protect,” “self-defense,”“punishment,” and “prevention.” When one
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examines the connotational meanings associated with “targeted killings,” it becomes
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apparent that said meanings are better viewed as being ontological/constitutive, as
opposed to being considered causal/disease-symptom. Specifically, there is no causal
relationship to be found among the meanings associated with the concept in question.
For example, the act of just simply being a state does not cause a state to attack specific
members of an armed non-state actor. Rather, the meanings are better seen as being
ontological/constitutive. The actors, actions, and conditions considered necessary for a
targeted killing are constitutive, in that the combination of these constitute a targeted
killing.
In regards to internal complexity, portions of the connotative aspects of the term
“targeted killing,” are fairly consistent in the literature. There have been absolutely no
debates over the roles the actors play in the operation. All of the literature is in agreement
that targeted killings are carried out by state actors against members of armed non-state
groups. However, there has been an extreme level of connotational debate concerning
whether or not targeted killings are the same thing as assassination and whether or not it
is a form of warfare or an (illegal) method of law enforcement.
In essence, the debate concerning the connotative aspects of the concept of
targeted killings has centered around the issues of its differentiation from assassination
and whether or not it is an act of law enforcement or warfare. As outlined above, states
that utilize targeted killings and those scholars who argue in favor of targeted killings
hold that targeted killings are a form of warfare. On the other hand, those who argue
against targeted killings argue that terrorism is a criminal act, and thus targeted killings
constitute an illegal, extrajudicial form of punishment. The entirety of the connotational
debate hinges upon this issue.
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There has been agreement on the denotative aspects of the term “targeted killings”
in the literature. The initiator referents in all cases have been the United States and Israel
as the initiators, whilst the recipient referents in all cases have been members of armed
non-state actors. Presumably, any utilization of such tactics by other states would also
qualify as a targeted killing. Thus, there seem to be no cleavages in the academic
community concerning the denotative (referent) aspects of the concept.
At issue is the fact that, in the current time period, targeted killings suffers from
collective ambiguity. As Connolly explains, collective ambiguity occurs when every
scholar ascribes her own meaning to the definition of a term (1974, p. 35). Whilst there
has been agreement amongst scholars in regards to the actors involved in targeted
killings, there have been issues relating to ambiguity in regards to the appraisive
dimension of the term. Specifically, the scholarly community does seem to be in
agreement that targeted killings are carried out by state actors against specific members
of armed non-state actors. Thus, a non-state actor targeting a member of another nonstate actor would not constitute a targeted killing under any conventional take on the
concept. However, there has been an extreme level of ambiguity in academia in regard to
whether or not targeted killings are morally and/or legally the same thing as political
assassination and whether or not it is a law enforcement or military operation 1.
Concerning the Appraisive Dimension
As Connolly states, “essentially contested concepts…are typically appraisive in
that to call something „a work of art‟ or a „democracy‟ is both to describe it and to ascribe
a value to it” (1974, p. 22). Arguably, the literature itself provides the greatest evidence

1

Debates over whether or not a “ticking time bomb” scenario pertains to targeted killings has never been
an issue, as the targets have always been high ranking officials who do not actually carry out such attacks.
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in favor of not utilizing an appraisive dimension when operationalizing targeted killings.
Unsurprisingly, due to the divisive nature of the subject matter, individual authors‟
operationalizations and categorizations of targeted killings often reflect their own
personal biases and predispositions on the issue. In this regard, the connotational aspects
of the term “targeted killing” has been the source of debate, whilst the denotational
aspects of the term have never been a point of contention. As explained above, many of
the terms connotationally associated with targeted killings have been “loaded.” Examples
would include the arguments that targeted killings are “extrajudicial,” “revenge,” and
“punitive.” On the other hand, positive connotations associated with the term include “the
responsibility to protect {the citizenry},” “self-defense,” and “prevention.” Thus, the
contestations concerning the appraisive dimension of the term have been
inherently based upon normative evaluations of the connotational aspect of the term.
Arguably, it is difficult to tease out where the appraisive debate begins and ends
in regards to the connotative and denotative portions of the definition of targeted killings.
At issue is the fact that all of the research has focused upon the programs carried out by
the United States and Israel. It is quite possible that the biases (whether favorable or not)
that each individual holds in regards to the US and Israel could strongly influence their
normative views concerning the connotative aspects of the programs in question. Thus,
personal biases concerning the denotative referents would inherently bias could bias
one‟s appraisal of the connotative dimension. In addition, the denotational aspects of the
targets of such strikes are also at issue. Whether or not the intended target is involved in
the military aspects of the group seems to be the key issue. Therefore, much of the
concerns pertaining to use of force against members of armed non-state groups is based
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upon whether or not they are morally/legally targets. In a similar fashion, assassination is
generally considered distasteful, as the targets of assassination are political officials.
Hence, it is difficult for scholars to separate the relationship between the connotative and
denotative aspects of this particular term under question in regards to its appraisive
dimension.
However, scholars must remember that it is in the best interests of the social
sciences that normative issues remain outside their scope of examination, for this is that
which separates social science from philosophy. Whilst it is difficult to separate one‟s
personal views from their work on any controversial subject, it is still possible. It is with
this goal in mind that Sartori outlined the manner in which to properly define concepts
through the utilization of necessary and sufficient conditions. Only through the adoption
of a normatively-neutral definition of targeted killings can social scientists be able to
engage in research into the subject matter virtually free from the constraints of biases.
Thus, the appraisive dimension should play absolutely no role in the operationalization of
the term. Rather, normative concerns should be dropped in favor of a neutral legal-based
operationalization of the term. However, this should in no way be interpreted to mean
that the normative dimensions cannot be studied scientifically (see Miller & Jackman,
2004). In fact, the conceptualization of targeted killings which is outlined in the final
section of this paper utilizes customary laws and norms as its basis to demonstrate how
targeted killings are different from political assassinations. In essence, research into
targeted killings has been hampered specifically because scholars have focused so
strongly upon the appraisive dimension of the issues.
However, a few key facts may be objectively examined under the appraisive
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dimension. As explained in the previous section, norms and laws prohibiting
assassination have always and unambiguously been targeted towards preventing the
killing of political officials, not military officials. In addition, it is also outlined that,
under the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention (including the Additional
Protocols), those who take part in hostilities lose their status as civilians. Eickenspahr
notes that United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 “reinforced the
right of victims of terror attacks to use lethal force in self-defense, (2003, p. 38). The
codification of the status of members of non-state armed groups under international laws
pertaining to military issues demonstrates that terrorism is more closely linked with acts
of warfare than it is with pure criminal enterprises. Furthermore, legal presidents have
been set which have interpreted said laws and conventions in the aforementioned manner.
Hence, if terrorism constitutes an act of war, then targeted killings is a form of warfare.
In such a situation, targeted killings would be consistent with conventional norms
regarding warfare. If targeted killings are a tactic of war, then, they are differentiated
from political assassinations which have been legally and normatively held as being
criminal acts. Thus, it appears that targeted killings can be legally and normatively
justified, and differentiated from political assassinations, under conventional thought on
subject matters of war and crime.
What of the Family Resemblance Concept?
One may question why the family resemblance concept (FRC) approach to
concept formation has not been utilized for examining targeted killings. The issue is that
it would be rather difficult to use the FRC approach in the case of targeted killings. In the
following paragraphs it is demonstrated why this is the case.
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As Goertz explains, the basic level is the key “theoretical” level in which the
concept under observation serves as “the noun to which we attach adjectives” (2006, p.
6). Targeted killings do not necessarily fit within the basic level which Goertz speaks of.
The examples which Goertz provides of basic level concepts include “corporatism,”
“democracy,” and “welfare state.” In addition, his examples of an adjective being
attached to a noun at this level include “parliamentary democracy” and “democratic
corporatism” (emphases in original) (p. 6). Targeted killings, unlike the concept of
democracy, do not seem to fit in the basic level due to the fact that the term is not as
theoretical. In addition, there does not appear to be any logically consistent way to attach
adjectives to said noun. One would be unlikely to speak of an “extrajudicial targeted
killing” compared to a “self-defense targeted killing” compared to “a non-state initiated
targeted killing.” Thus, whilst there are strong debates concerning the concept of
“targeted killings,” said concept does not appear to fit within the basic level as elaborated
upon by Goertz.
Arguably, the concept of targeted killings would fit on the secondary level as
outlined by Goertz. Under such circumstances, it is arguable that the basic level concept
would be “warfare” as opposed to “targeted killings” itself. Goertz explains that the
secondary level is where we give the concept “its constitutive dimensions” in relation to
the basic level term (2006, p. 6). In addition, it is at this level where one examines the
“causal mechanisms” (p. 6). Targeted killings could fit on the secondary level since such
an operation would be a part of the basic level concept of warfare. However, the concept
of targeted killings could not fit within this level due to the fact that the concept of
targeted killings does not include causal mechanisms. Thus, targeted killings may
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tentatively fit within the secondary level as outlined by Goertz.
To attempt to examine the concept of targeted killings through the FRC approach
would be an exercise in futility. As Goertz explains, FRC approach “is in many ways the
polar opposite of the necessary and sufficient one” (2006, p. 7). FRC has no necessary
conditions, only sufficient conditions (pp. 7, 36). In this line of reasoning, it would not
matter which actor was either the recipient or initiator of a strike. In addition, neither
would the status of the target as either a military or political official be problematic.
Goertz also explains that in order to meet the required sufficient conditions, the m-of-n
rule must be met, which means that phenomenon under observation must meet or surpass
a “minimum threshold” (m) of characteristics (n) (p. 36). Thus, the sufficient conditions
of “state initiator,” “non-state actor,” and “specific target” could be met, but the target
could be a “political actor.” The only way that the FRC approach would work in the
targeted killing would be if m were equal to all of n The FRC approach also holds to
substitutability, meaning that a missing “dimension” of a phenomenon can be substituted
for in this manner of concept formation (p. 45). To do otherwise would mean that one
could never truly differentiate between targeted killings and political assassinations. To
utilize the FRC approach in the case of targeted killings would provide nothing new to
the literature. Therefore, the only sufficient way to separate “targeted killings” from
“political assassinations” would be to utilize the necessary and sufficient conditions
frame work as outlined by Sartori.
Targeted Killings and the Ladder of Abstraction
As one can see (Figure 2), the only way to resolve the debates concerning the
differentiation of targeted killings and assassination is to utilize the necessary and
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sufficient conditions approach to concept formation. In the following pages, it shall be
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demonstrated that how targeted killings can be conceptualized in a manner free from bias.
It shall be argued that only necessary conditions can be utilized to conceptualize targeted
killings. Furthermore, the rung which targeted killings occupy upon the ladder of
abstraction shall be examined. Finally, concerns over the conceptualization of
“assassinations” shall be taken into account.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions of Targeted Killings:
1. The act is carried out by a state actor. As the literature demonstrates, the only instances
which have been referred to as targeted killings have been those in which the
actor which carried out the strike was a state. No piece found in the literature has
referred to an attack made by a non-state actor as a targeted killing. Thus, the
literature demonstrates that targeted killings inherently refer to acts carried out by
a state.
2. The target of the act is an individual actor {or, a small group of specific individuals}.
A review of the literature makes it apparent that “targeted killings” refers to an act
which targets specific individuals, rather than a group as a whole. Therefore,
targeted killings are differentiated from carpet bombings of military bases and set
piece battles in the Fulda Gap.
3. The targeted individual actor is a member of a group which is a non-state actor. This
differentiation is necessary in order to separate targeted killings from
assassinations. If the individual were a political official, then the strike would
automatically be categorized as a political assassination.
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4. The non-state actor in questions has an armed wing. If the group is not armed, then the
protections of the Hague Conventions, the Geneva Convention (and its various
Additional Protocols), etcetera would apply to the members of the group.
5. If the group has an affiliated political party, the individual targeted is not an elected
official in a government. An attack on a political actor automatically qualifies as a
political assassination.
6. Whether or not hostilities are currently underway when the strike occurs matters not.
Since a full, official declaration of war does not necessarily exist between the
state and non-state actors in question, then (arguably) a state of hostilities between
the two parties is in a constant state of existence. Hence, the end of hostilities only
occurs when one or both of the parties is either destroyed or dissolved.
As one can see (Figure 3), an examination of the literature presented above
indicates that many scholars appear to place assassinations and targeted killings upon the
same ladder. Under this conceptualization, “violence,” in all of its various forms, would
serve as the highest rung of the ladder. Under this would be the root concept, “killing,”
which would include all forms of killing. Thus, there would be no differentiation between
murders, warfare, justifiable homicides, etc. Under this rung would be specific acts, such
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as targeted killings, assassinations, naval battles, etc. Hence, it appears that the implicit

ladder of abstraction which could be culled from the literature places “killing” upon the
root concept rung, which therefore leads to the placement of all specific acts of killing
being placed upon the rung below the root concept.
As discussed earlier, the examples of targeted killings which have been examined
and debated over in the literature have all been the product of state behavior. All of the
literature on the topic -- be it normative, legal, or empirical, has made it clear that
targeted killings are a tactic solely utilized by state actors. In addition, traditionally,
targeted killing incidents have seen members of non-state actors being the targets of such
attacks. Thus, a targeted killing would constitute a form of attack conducted by a state
actor, and directed towards a member of a non-state entity. Thus, targeted killings are
undoubtedly a form of warfare utilized by state actors against members of non-state
actors. This would differentiate it from a political assassination, which could be carried
out by any form of actor, but would be directed towards an individual who is an official
of the state.
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This article argues for the ladder of abstraction for targeted killings presented
below (Figure 4). In this manner, “killing” would serve as the highest, most general rung
upon the ladder of abstraction. Thus, any form of killing whatsoever would in some way
fall under this level. However, the next rung down in this examination would be that of
“warfare.” Moving down the ladder, one finds the concept of targeted killings as a
specific tactic of warfare. This tactic would be differentiated from a standard military
attack due to the fact that either a single individual or small group of individuals (say, the
leadership of a group) are specifically targeted for elimination, rather than the entire
membership of the group in a certain area being the general target for an attack.

Therefore, a targeted killing would be akin to an attempted killing of Osama bin Laden
and Ayman al-Zawahiri, as opposed to the carpet bombing of an Al-Qaeda training camp.
This tactic would also be differentiated from an assassination because members of nonstate groups are the targets of targeted killings, whilst individuals whom are members of
the government are the targets of assassinations.
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Under the ladder of abstraction, a targeted killing would be solely directed
towards members of a non-state actor, holding that the non-state actor in question has an
armed wing. As the literature presented above demonstrates, targeted killings have
generally been directed towards individuals who are members of armed non-state actors.
Thus, attacks against an unarmed non-state actor would not constitute a targeted killing.
For example, an attack against the leadership of Al-Qaeda would unambiguously
constitute a targeted killing. On the other hand, an attack upon the leadership of
Greenpeace would be an unambiguous example of state terrorism. Thus, only attacks
against members of armed non-state actors would fit within the
operationalization of targeted killings.
One may attempt to argue that a potential cause for concern in the ladder of
abstraction would be in the case where a non-state entity has both a military component
and a civilian political party. However, the configuration under the ladder would still
hold true with no real problems. The present configuration holds that there is a difference
between killing government officials and those connected with the military apparatus of
the non-state actor. Killing a member of non-state actor under such circumstances would
in no way be problematic for the definition so long as the individual targeted was not a
member of the government at the time the attack occurred. Any attack which would
specifically target a member of the group whom was simultaneously a member of the
government would automatically constitute an assassination attempt under the current
operationalization. Thus, the current configuration of the ladder stands firm against such
concerns.
One may ask where the term “assassination” falls on the ladder of abstraction (see
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Figure 4). Arguably, there are two places upon the ladder in which assassination may be
placed. Assassination could be seen as a “diminished subtype” of targeted killings. The
killing of a political actor would be seen as a case which fails to meet the necessary and
sufficient conditions of a targeted killing, namely the requirement that the target be a
member of the military wing of the non-state actor. Thus, an assassination would fall
aside from targeted killings as a diminished subtype. The other way in which one could
address the placement of assassination on the ladder would be to place it under a separate
root concept run named “murder.” In such a case, assassination would be placed at the
same rung on which targeted killings stands on the adjoining ladder. In conclusion, either
of the abovementioned placements for the term “assassination” would be sufficient and
logically consistent, with no real preference being given to either position.
In conclusion, this reconceptualization of targeted killings allows one to better
understand its placement upon the ladder of abstraction. Furthermore, this format allows
one to empirically distinguish between targeted killings and assassinations in an objective
and norm-free manner.
Conclusion
The new formulation of targeted killings is advantageous for the scientific
community for several key reasons. Firstly, the conceptualization delinks targeted killings
from the law enforcement paradigm. Since the military and intelligence services are
utilized for the purposes of attacking specific members of an armed non-state actor, it
becomes clear that targeted killings are a form of warfare utilized by states. Secondly, the
new terminology allows scholars to unambiguously differentiate between examples of
targeted killings and assassinations, thus ensuring that members of the academic and
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policy communities are “speaking the same language.” This has been achieved simply by
placing all killings of government political officials within the realm of assassination,
whilst simultaneously placing the killing of all individuals connected with non-state
armed activities under the heading of targeted killings. Lastly, and flowing forth from the
first two, the new differentiation eliminates normative concerns by making it starkly clear
which activities are assassination, and which are not, thus preventing scholars from
labeling such activities any way they please.

Chapter 3: A Gap in the Literature
The use of targeted killings by state actors against non-state actors has become a
contentious issue in the United States‟ “War on Terror.” The debates surrounding
targeted killings appear to center around three main issues. First, there are debates among
ethicists concerning the normative implications that arise from the utilization of targeted
killings by states (Stein, 2003; David, 2003b; Hitz, 2002; Lang, 2008; Altman &
Wellman, 2008; Dolnik, 2002; Kasher & Yadlin, 2005). For example, is it proper for
states to kill individuals whom they deem to be enemies of the state? Or, is it an
obligation of states to take all possible actions in order to defend their citizens? Thus, the
issue is contested on normative grounds.
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Second, both international law and domestic laws play a strong role in the debate
over targeted killings (Gross, 2006; Machon, 2006; Melzer, 2008; Osiel, 2009; Ratner,
2007; Casey, 2005; Guiora, 2004; Fisher, 2007; Solis, 2007; Eickenspahr, 2003).
For example, is it legal for a state to kill an individual who is not affiliated with the
military of another state? What legal issues surround the killing of individuals by one
state, on the territory of another state? Could the use of targeted killings violate the
domestic laws of a particular state? In summary, a myriad of legal quandaries come forth
in this debate.
Finally, empirical questions come to play in the debate over targeted killings
(Byman, 2006; Wilner, 2010; Zussman & Zussman, 2006; Jaeger & Paserman, 2007;
Hafez and Hatfield, 2006; Jacobson & Kaplan, 2007; Radlauer, 2006; Kober, 2007;
Catignani; 2008; Honig, 2008; Ben-Yehuda, 1990). Are targeted killings an effective
defense against terrorist attacks? Can targeted killings serve a deterrent role? Is there any
way to estimate the effectiveness of targeted killings? Thus, issues concerning empirical
evidence and methodology come into play in the debate.
In conclusion, this literature review attempts to tackle this leviathan through
investigating targeted killings through the four main streams of the literature. Hence, the
first portion of this review examines the historical literature. Afterwards, normative
writings are examined. Following this, legal scholarship on the matter is taken into
account. Finally, the empirical/methodological literatures on the subject are examined.
Hence, this literature review attempts to contribute to the literature as a whole through
outlining the current state of the literature and uncovering the gaps in the literature.
Historical Cases of Targeted Killing Programs
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While many authors have touched on the historical use of targeted killings in
their research, only a scant proportion of the literature focuses specifically on the
historical cases of such tactics. Furthermore, much of the literature has focused mainly
upon the Israeli program of targeted killings, to the neglect of other similar programs.
Thus, this portion of the literature could indeed be improved upon.
As shall be seen below, much of the historical literature has focused upon the
targeted killing of important political figures and leaders. An example of this would be
the work of Harris Lentz (1988), which consists of paragraph-long entries which
highlight the killings of famous individuals from 1865 to 1986. However, other scholars
have attempted to provide slightly more in-depth analyses of the predicating events and
aftereffects of such assassinations (see Laucella, 1998). Finally, a smaller proportion of
the literature has examined historical cases of assassination from a concretely academic
perspective. Representative of this part of the literature is the work of Havens, Leiden,
and Schmitt (1970) (see also Rapoport, 1971; Kramer, 2004). Such works examine issues
such as the problem of defining assassination and calculating the effects of assassination
(Havens, et al., p. vii). However, such writings have still focused exclusively on historical
cases of assassinations of government officials and political leaders. In addition, they
have been extremely general in the geographical and temporal scope of their respective
analyses.
The Israelis
A few scholars focused upon specific cases and programs of targeted killings
from a historical perspective (Ben-Yehuda, 1990; Palmer-Fernandez, 2000; Tal Tovy,
2009). However, the majority of the works in this category of the historical literature has
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been narrowly focused upon a single state – Israel (Ben Naftali, 2007; Cohen & Shany,
2007; David, 2003a). In addition, such examinations have almost exclusively served as
preludes to either normative or legal arguments concerning the Israeli program (Ben
Naftali, 2007; Cohen & Shany, 2007; David, 2003a; Gross, 2003; Kasher & Yadlin,
2005; etc.).
However, certain information about the Israeli program can still be garnered.
First, the Israeli‟s have utilized killings off and on throughout history. Targeted killings
were utilized both in ancient Israel, and by underground groups such as the Hagana
(David, 2003a, p. 2; Ben-Yehuda, 1990). Second, the underground groups utilized the
Biblical cases of targeted killings as a justification for their use against all enemies
(David, pp. 2-3). Targets of Israeli killings have included members of the British
occupation forces, Arabs, Nazi-sympathizers living in Israel during the time of the British
protectorate, and fellow Jews (Ben-Yehuda, pp. 356, 358, 360). Third, since
independence, Israel has continued to utilize killings (p. 3). Fourth, the Israelis prefer to
refer to their tactic as either “targeted thwarting” or “interceptions” (David, p. 2). Fifth, a
variety of tactics have been utilized in the conduct of targeted killing operations. For
example, Mistar’aravim, teams of individuals disguised as Arabs, have conducted
killings (Catignani, 2005, pp. 64). Uniformed snipers have also been utilized (Bar, 2005,
p. 134). Other tactics have included “helicopter gunships, fighter aircraft, tanks, car
bombs,” and “booby traps” (David, p. 1). Sixth, the Israelis have begun utilizing targeted
killings more frequently since the start of the Second Intifada in 2000 (Henriksen, 2007,
p. 22). Finally, the Israeli Supreme Court has ruled that targeted killings are legal under
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both Israeli and international law (Fenrick, 2007; Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, 2007; Cassese,
2007; Cohen & Shany, 2007; Ben-Naftali, 2007; Crawford, 2007).
The United Kingdom
There are two key works which have examined the usage of targeted killings of
individuals during the conflicts in Ireland during the last century. Palmer-Fernandez
(2000) examines British intelligence‟s utilization of a death squad known as the “Cairo
Gang.” The group was organized for the purposes of terminating the leadership of Sinn
Fein (p. 160). The British plan was for its operatives to dress as civilians and launch a
series of coordinated nighttime attacks to kill high-ranking members of Sinn Fein (pp.
160-161). However, the majority of Palmer-Fernandez‟s article focuses on Sinn Fein‟s
successful counterplot to kill the British operatives before their plans had been realized
and the aftermath (pp. 160-162). Sinn Fein was successful in eliminating the operatives,
but this resulted in British Army reprisals against Irish civilians (p. 162). Christopher
Tuck (2007) has examined more recent cases of the United Kingdom‟s covert and overt
war in Northern Ireland. While he did not specifically address the issue of targeted
killings, he does indirectly mention official tactics which seem to border upon being
classified as targeted killings. Covert forces were known to have “shot first, and asked
questions later” in regards to engaging suspected IRA members “rather than arresting
them” (p. 174). The Special Air Service (SAS) was also known for participating in
ambushes in theater (p. 175). Thus, the United Kingdom does appear to have utilized
targeted killings in the past, but the existence of a contemporary program is in question.
The United States
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In a fashion similar to that of the Israeli case, examinations of the historical usage
of targeted killings by the United States have focused on the War on Terror and have
generally served as backgrounders to either normative or legal arguments (Duffy, 2005;
Downes, 2004; etc.). However, the current US targeted killing program was not its first
experience with such a program. For example, Tal Tovy provides, arguably, the most
thorough and in-depth historical case study of a state‟s targeted killing program. His case
example was the United States‟ targeted killing program during the Vietnam War, which
was codenamed “The Phoenix Program” (2009, p. 1). Through process-tracing, he
elaborates on the formation of the program, its implementation, and measurements of its
effectiveness (pp. 1-2, 17). It was found that the program was heavily influenced by
American insights into the lessons learned from the United Kingdom‟s earlier campaign
in Malaysia and France‟s war in Indochina (pp. 2, 6). The program was developed due to
the purposeful collaboration of military, political, and social science specialists (p. 7).
The program was funded by the CIA and executed by US Special Forces and
their Vietnamese trainees (pp. 7, 10-11). The purpose of the program was to capture
and/or kill individuals whom had been identified by local Vietnamese as being members
of the Viet Cong (pp. 13-15). He concludes his work, finding that the program did indeed
bring a critical level of harm to the effectiveness and operational scope of the Viet
Cong‟s activities, with upwards of 81,740 VC having been killed between 1968 and 1972
(pp. 17-21).
Thus, the US has had a history of debating the relative merits and legality of
targeted killings. For example, the CIA was involved in numerous operations which
attempted to kill foreign leaders between the 1950s and 1970s (Hitz, 2002, p. 775). This
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led to the “Church Committee hearings” in the US Senate between the years 1975 and
1976 (p. 765). The committee‟s findings led to the signing of Executive Order 12,333 by
Gerald Ford (p. 765). His successors have not rescinded the aforementioned order (pp. 1,
774-776). This policy has been a continuing influence on US decisions on whether or not
to target particular individuals. For example, an American General was relieved of his
command in the lead up to the First Gulf War when he suggested that the US would
attempt to kill Saddam Hussein (Lotrionte, 2003, pp. 73-74). The executive branch of the
US government was adamant in its public statements that it did not condone
assassinations (p. 74). Interestingly, the United Kingdom secretly argued in favor of
assassinating Hussein (Thomas, 2005, p. 27). However, by the time of the Second Gulf
War, the US government had modified its views, and specifically targeted Hussein and
the Iraqi leadership for liquidation (Watkin, 2004, p. 8). Hence, the current debates over
targeted killings are nothing new in government circles.
In regards to the current program, a great deal of the literature has focused upon
one particular case example: the 2003 killing of an Al-Qaeda operative in Yemen
(Thomas, 2005; Foot, 2007; Lang, 2008; Fisher, 2007; Hajjar, 2003; Machon, 2006;
Plaw, 2007; etc.). However, Kessler and Warner have noted that, as of 2008, the US has
“engaged in at least 20 officially acknowledged targeted killing operations in a wide
variety of countries, including Somalia, Yemen, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sudan and
Iraq” (2008, p. 290). On the other hand, since little is publicly known about other cases,
the Yemen example serves as a good case for examining the US program. Unlike the
Israeli program, with its diverse assortment of assassination activities, the Yemen
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example and other statements by the US government demonstrate that the US program
has generally relied upon the usage of missile attacks by aircraft (Machon, p. iii). In
particular, the program has relied upon unmanned Predator drones (Henriksen, 2007, pp.
23-24). A noted difference between the Israeli and US programs is that, while the
former‟s program is under the control of the military, the latter‟s is under the control of
the CIA (Ratner, 2008, p. 29; Solis, 2007, p. 130, Plaw, 2007, p. 4). Further elaboration
on the program is difficult to do, due to the program‟s high level of secrecy.
In summary, as important as all of this information is, there are five main
weaknesses within the literature, considering the present state of affairs regarding the
United States‟ “War on Terror.” Firstly, the majority of the works produced have focused
primarily upon the killing of political figures. Whilst there is nothing wrong with this
focus, considering previous historical trends, there is a noted lack of a comprehensive
historical review of targeted killing programs worldwide. Secondly, the literature has
been primarily atheoretical in its approach, mainly consisting of almost completely
encyclopedic accounts of assassinations. Only a small proportion has examined the
assassinations from theoretical perspectives. A great contribution would be done to the
literature if scholars from the realist, liberal, constructivist, and critical perspectives were
to produce historical analyses of targeted killing programs, grounded in their respective
theoretical heritages. Thirdly, very few works have gone very far in-depth into examining
the processes behind state adoption and implementation of targeted killing programs.
The majority of papers address history almost solely to provide background for either
normative or legal arguments. It would be a worthy addition to the literature if one
schooled in policy analysis were to provide a thorough examination of targeted killing
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programs. Fourthly, the majority of works have examined the Israeli and American cases,
to the almost complete exclusion of other historical examples. The study of targeted
killings would be well served by additions concerning the United Kingdom‟s program,
along with similar programs from other states. Finally, the majority of the literature has
only utilized historical methodologies, to the exclusion of true process-tracing and
quantitative methodologies. Hence, while scholars may learn a great deal from the
existing literature, there is still much that could be added.
Normative Implications of Targeted Killings
An examination of the normative literature related to targeted killings
demonstrates that the issue of morality plays a key role in the debates. The amount of
works on this aspect available to the scholar is only surpassed by that of the applicable
legal literature. It becomes apparent that there are two main sub-debates concerning
morality. First, scholars have questioned whether or not targeted killings are the moral
equivalent of political assassinations. At the same time, academics have struggled over
the issue of whether or not targeted killings are morally supported by the Just War
Theory.
Several scholars have attempted to argue against the morality of targeted killings,
utilizing Just War Theory as the basis for their case (Stein, 2003; Hitz, 2002; Lang,
2008). However, most of the critiques have served as backgrounders for legal arguments.
On the other hand, two authors provide relatively in-depth normative arguments against
targeted killings in the manner in which they are now conducted. Stein (2003) provides a
direct counterattack to the work of David (2003b). Stein argues that the Israeli program
does not meet the Just War criteria of proportionality in that approximately 33% of those
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killed in targeted killing operations have been “innocent bystanders” (p. 132). Stein also
argues that revenge is not a morally justifiable reason for utilizing targeted killings (p.
132). In fact, it is argued that David‟s argument concerning revenge could be turned
around to justify Palestinian attacks against the Israeli‟s (p. 132). Stein also implies that
terrorists should be punished in a court of law (pp. 132-133). Hitz (2002) argues that the
United States should not adopt a targeted killing program due to the unintended
consequence of opening up the American leadership to being the victims of targeted
killings themselves (p. 776). He also argues, in regards to the potential killing of rogue
leaders, that it is impossible to tell whether or not his successor would be any better or
worse (pp. 775-776). Lang (2008) argues that programs such as targeted killings are only
justifiable if they are sanctioned under a collective international system in which states
would have “adjudicating responsibility” (pp. 510-511). In summary, most scholars can
utilize Just War Theory to criticize the morality of targeted killing programs.
However, several scholars have argued in favor of the moral permissibility of
targeted killings in the War on Terror (Altman & Wellman, 2008; Dolnik, 2002, Kasher
& Yadlin, 2005). Kasher and Yadlin (2005) have argued that targeted killings are morally
justifiable under a modified view of Just War. They argue that a state‟s primary
responsibility is to protect its citizens, and thus, conducting a targeted killing is morally
justifiable, even if collateral damage may occur (p. 53). However, this is not meant to
mean that a state should not attempt to limit collateral damage (p. 53). The authors
address the issue of assassination by explaining that targeted killing may occasionally
appear to be the former due to the fact that “during an armed conflict, self-defense is a
political purpose” (p. 55). Meisels (2004) argues that unlike conventional wars, it is
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impossible for states to engage terrorists in “optimal battle settings” (i.e. solely on the
battlefield) (p. 301). Furthermore, she argues that targeted killings are a form of warfare
utilized for preventing or disrupting future attacks (p. 307). Thus, it is not a form of
punishment (eg. criminal justice), which outside of a trial is immoral to carry out (p. 306;
see also Thomas, 2005, p. 35). Anne-Marie Slaughter has gone as far to argue that
regime leaders should be targeted for killing under the auspices of the UN Security
Council (2003). It is argued that it is more moral to kill one leader than it is to kill another
countries soldiers and civilians (p. 72). However, she does not believe that it is morally
permissible for states to individually decide to eliminate a regime‟s leadership during a
war (p. 73).
However, some who argue that killing terrorist leaders is morally permissible,
also state that killing the leadership of rogue regimes is not (Thomas, p. 38). David
(2003a) argues that, while assassination and targeted killings are different activities, the
norm against assassination came about only as late as the 17 th century (p. 12). He argues
that targeted killings are permissible in that the Israeli program obeys Just War Theory‟s
preconditions of “discrimination” and “proportionality” (p. 17). In addition, the program
is morally justifiable due to the fact that it satisfies the Israeli public‟s desire for revenge
(pp. 17-18). He states that revenge is morally permissible in the context of war, which is
different from “domestic infractions” which are solved “through the rule of law” (p. 17).
Thus, while many scholars have utilized Just War Theory to argue in favor of targeted
killings, they have not all arrived at complete agreement in regards to the particulars of
the complete moral permissibility of all aspects of existing or potential programs.
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Some scholars, such as Neta Crawford (2003), have held that Just War Theory
does not apply to issues related to the War on Terror. She has argued that Just War
Theory is not necessarily a logical manner for states to base their actions on in the War
on Terror. She outlines a series of twelve points which demonstrate the problems with
Just War Theory (pp. 14-20). Included among these problems are Just War Theory‟s
requirements that war be a state‟s last resort, whether or not the theory should be applied
to actors whom have not adopted the theory, and the requirement that states only engage
in wars if they believe that they will be successful (pp. 16-17, 19; see also Dolnik, 2002).
Thus, certain scholars have attempted to explain that Just War Theory may not be
applicable in the 21st century.
There are four main problems with the existing literature concerning the morality
of targeted killings. Firstly, essentially every author, regardless of her position on the
issue, has attempted (explicitly or implicitly) to utilize either unmodified or modified
forms of Just War Theory to support her argument. While there is nothing inherently
wrong with one utilizing Just War Theory, it is arguable that a false consciousness
regarding morality has been created within the population of the West due to the
prevalence of this theory. It has been, arguably, reified in Western culture as the sole
basis of true morality regarding the laws of war. In addition, while it is held up as a
“Christian” standard of war due to its initial development by Augustine, the theory does
not necessarily reflect the Bible‟s teachings concerning war (See Deuteronomy Ch. 20; II
Samuel Ch. 22). Thus, Just War Theory is not necessarily the Biblical theory of war.
Secondly, the all of literature, aside from the work of Slaughter, presupposes that
assassination is morally wrong, regardless of the author‟s respective views on targeted
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killings. Again, the ghost of Augustine is likely lingering in the shadows behind this
supposition. Thirdly, the literature does not take into account moral arguments from other
philosophical traditions, in particular from other Christian scholars (especially from nonCatholics). Finally, much of the literature seems self-contradictory, in regards to its
confusion over the differences between law enforcement and wartime morality.
Law and Targeted Killings
The vast majority of research conducted on targeted killings has come from the
legal community (Ratner, 2008; Casey, 2005; Downes, 2004; Solis, 2007; Guiora, 2004;
Eickenspahr, 2003). The myriad debates concerning the legality of targeted killings can
be reduced to the following two main legal perspectives: those whom view terrorism as
being governed by criminal law, and those whom view terrorism as being governed by
the laws of war. This is the key debate from which all legal arguments on the issue appear
to flow.
Gross (2006) notes that the main debate among scholars and policymakers in
regards to targeted killings is whether terrorism is a criminal act or an act of war (pp.
323-324; see also Machon, 2006; Melzer, 2008; Osiel, 2009; Ratner, 2007). Those whom
argue against the legality of targeted killings, appear to adopt the perspective that
terrorism is a criminal act. Ratner (2008) argues that terrorists are “quasi-civilians” and
can only be targeted whilst they are physically engaged in attacks (p. 30). Otherwise, they
must be captured and placed on trial (p. 30; see also Casey, 2005, pp. 337-338). Scholars
operating from this perspective have utilized an eclectic grouping of domestic and
international laws to make their arguments. Casey (2005) argues that, in the Israeli case,
both parties to the conflict are governed by Geneva Convention IV and the First
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Additional Protocol due the Israeli occupation (pp. 318-319). It is argued that targeted
killings violate international humanitarian law as laid out in the aforementioned
agreements, but do not rise to the level of crimes against humanity as defined by the
Rome Statute (pp. 322, 337-343). Ratner (2007) explains that the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has outlawed the “extrajudicial killing of
any individual” (p. 258). Furthermore, “the 1998 Statute of the International Criminal
Court, states may not target civilians or civilian objects, and they may not engage in
attacks that cannot by their nature distinguish between civilians and combatants” (p. 258).
Targeted killing must be utilized as a last resort measure only, if capture is impossible
(pp. 274-275). Downes (2004) argues that targeted killings are illegal under any
interpretation of international law, regardless of the argument that it is legal under the
right to self-defense doctrine of Article 51 of the UN Charter (pars. 21, 30-34). Hitz hints
that targeted killings are illegal due to the continued emplacement of Executive order
12,333, which outlawed the use of assassination by the United States (2002, pp. 774777). It is interesting to note that some scholars who have utilized international
humanitarian law to argue against targeted killings have admitted that said laws have
traditionally only applied to actions taken by states within their own borders (Ratner,
2007, pp. 261-262).
Some scholars have argued that targeted killings are legal under international law.
Such authors have generally viewed terrorism as an act of war, and have thus examined
the legality of targeted killings from the perspective of the laws of war. It is argued that
terrorists are not to be equated with being civilians. Solis (2007) reminds scholars that the
definition of “civilian” under international law is not necessarily to be interpreted as
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meaning “noncombatant” (pp. 134-136). Accordingly, terrorists “fit none of the various
criteria for prisoner-of-war status contained in 1949 Geneva Convention III” (p. 136).
Guiora (2004), utilizing the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War explains that terrorists are “combatants minus any insignia” (p. 331). Thus, it is
argued that criminal law is not necessarily applicable to the disposition of terrorists.
It is also argued that targeted killings and assassinations are not necessarily
outlawed under international law. Eickenspahr (2003) argues that targeted killings are not
prohibited by either Hague Convention (II) or Additional Protocol I, due to the fact that
strikes do not necessarily constitute “treachery” or “perfidy” (pp. 36-37; see also Solis,
2007). Some have also argued that targeted killings are legal under United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which “reinforced the right of victims of
terror attacks to use lethal force in self-defense (Eickenspahr, p. 38). Gross (2006)
explains that international law does not outlaw assassinations; rather, it outlaws “perfidy”
(p. 325; Fisher, 2007; see also Guiora, 2004). Neither the “the 1907 Hague Convention
on the Laws and Customs of War nor the 1949 Geneva Conventions” specifically
prohibit the killing of any combatant or regime leader during a time of war (Lotrionte,
2003, p. 78). The only restrictions on targeted killings would be the prohibitions
concerning “treachery,” the cause of “unnecessary suffering,” and “indiscriminate
attacks;” which are outlawed by the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Convention
and the Hague Convention (p. 78; see also Plaw, 2007). Finally, it is argued that the
Rome Statutes do not apply to targeted killing programs provided that such programs
“avoid foreseeable [non-combatant] casualties” (Plaw, p. 12). While some scholars state
that the optimal legal option is to arrest such individuals, when terrorists are beyond the
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legal jurisdiction of a state or its allies, targeted killings are legal under international law
(Solis, p. 136). While all of the aforementioned scholars agree that states can individually
utilize targeted killings, one has argued that such programs it must conducted
multilaterally to remain legal. Slaughter (2003) supports the usage of targeted killings,
but argues that they would only be legal if they were to be authorized by the UN Security
Council. Thus, there appears to support from international law in favor of targeted
killings.
Some academics have also taken into account applicable domestic laws. Solis
(2007) argues that Executive Order 12,333 does not apply to targeted killings, as said
order only addresses assassinations of political figures (p. 134). Lotrionte (2003) notes
that, while Executive Order 12,333 prohibits assassination, no definition of
“assassination” was provided (p. 76). In addition, from the context of the ongoing debates
and hearings during the period, it becomes apparent that the order was “intended to
prohibit the killing of foreign political leaders as long as the United States was not
engaged in armed conflict with the countries of those leaders” (p. 76). Thus, it is argued
that there is a distinct legal difference between assassination and targeted killings in
domestic US law.
A good proportion of the literature has focused upon the ruling made by the
Israeli Supreme Court in regards to the legality of targeted killings under both
international and domestic Israeli law. Some scholars have suggested that the most
surprising portion of the Israeli ruling was the court‟s assertion that targeted killings can
sometimes be illegal, and that the Court has the authority to rule on the legality of each
killing on a case by case basis (Ben-Naftali, 2007, pp. 328-329, 331). The Israeli
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Supreme Court ruled that the state‟s targeted killing program was legal under both the
laws of war and international humanitarian law (Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, 2007, pp. 460461). Furthermore, the Court ruled that, while the Palestinian militants were not to
be considered “unlawful combatants” under the “the Hague Regulations and in the
Geneva Convention, they lose their legal protections as civilians during the time in which
they take “direct part in hostilities” following the Court‟s interpretation of “Article 51(3)
of Additional Protocol I” of the Geneva Convention (p. 61). This case was the first ruling
handed down by any court in regards to Additional Protocol I, thus setting legal
precedent (p. 463). Ben-Naftali and Michaeli criticize the Court for not defining more
precisely what constitutes “civilians who take direct part in the hostilities” (p. 465, see
also Cohen & Shany, 2007).
On the other hand, some scholars have applauded the Israeli court for its eclectic
approach to legal reasoning and demonstration of a willingness to review the legality of
targeted killings on a case by case basis (Cassese, 2007; Cohen & Shany, 2007; Fenrick,
2007). In fact, Schondorf (2007) argues that the restrictions placed on the Israeli military
by the court goes “beyond what is commonly considered to be mandated under this body
of law {laws of war and international humanitarian law }” (p. 308). Some have noted the
Court‟s ruling as groundbreaking due to its legal codification of what constitutes
proportionality (Cohen & Shany, 2007, pp. 312-318). Thus, legal rulings of the Israeli
Supreme Court have received a great deal of attention
Some scholars have argued that the main problem with current debates
concerning targeted killings is the legal ambiguity of terrorism. Fisher (2007) argues that
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current international law does not truly address targeted killings, considering that the
legal community is divided over which laws are applicable (p. 757). It is argued that the
legal community must work together to codify new rules to aid and guide state behavior
in this new issue area (pp. 757-758). Arend (2003) concludes that “for all practical
purposes, the UN Charter framework is dead” due to the fact that it does not take into
account issues such as terrorism (pp. 100-102; see also Guiora, 2004). Thus, such
scholars conclude that targeted killings are legal under current international law, but it is
recommended that the US work with the rest of the international community to develop
new rules which reflect the realities of the modern world, but can still govern state
behavior (p. 102).
As one can see, there is no lack of legal studies of targeted killings. The main
issue to be resolved among legal scholars is the confusion of whether the fight against
terrorism is governed by the rules of law enforcement or the rules of war. Furthermore, it
becomes apparent that scholars are attempting to make up for the lack of explicit
international laws pertaining to combating terrorism by utilizing a veritable hodgepodge
of existing laws to make their legal arguments. What is lacking in the legal community
are actionable recommendations for creating new international laws which specifically
pertain to governing conflicts between state and non-state actors.
Empirical and Methodological Issues Related to Targeted Killings
Arguably, the most neglected part of the literature has been that which examines
the empirical effectiveness of targeted killings and methodological issues related to the
study of targeted killings. In a fashion similar to that of the historical literature,
investigations into the effectiveness of targeted killings have served as small non-
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empirical appendages to normative and legal arguments. However, a few scholars have
attempted to provide empirical arguments concerning the effectiveness of targeted
killings. Such works have utilized methodologies as diverse as case studies, quantitative
methods, and game theory. Explicit examinations of the methodological challenges
involved with studying this subject, have been lacking in the literature. Thus, the matters
of empirical data and methodology are arguably the most fruitful areas for future study
and research.
The several studies which have focused upon the effectiveness of targeted killings
have utilized case studies as their research method. Daniel Byman (2006) finds that the
number of Israelis killed in attacks conducted by Hamas fell each year from 2001 to 2005
(par. 27). This is correlated with the increased usage of targeted killings by the IDF (par.
00). While the number of attacks conducted by Hamas increased over the period, their
lethality dropped (par. 27). It is argued that the killing of key leaders and technical
specialists has brought this to be (par. 28). Furthermore, the now dead Hamas leader,
Rantisi, “conceded that the killings had made things harder for his organization” (par.
32). Also, in “2005 the group even declared that it would unilaterally accept a "period of
calm" because of the losses it was suffering among its senior cadre” (par. 32; see also
Bar, 2008).
Wilner (2010) also examines the effectiveness of targeted killings through the use
of comparative case studies (and resulting statistics) of four targeted killings conducted in
Afghanistan (p. 307). He notes that some targeted killings have resulted in leadership
vacuums that directly led to combat between rival groups of terrorists vying for control
over the organization (p. 313). This happened in the wake of the killing of Mullah
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Dadullah, in which the lack of a leader allowed fighting to break out amongst rival
factions (p. 313). He created datasets to go along with his case studies. He constructed
“before” and “after” datasets in order to determine if there were any changes in group
behavior after the targeted killing was carried out (p. 317). He examined cases intranationally in order to serve as a control for differing “sociopolitical” conditions as would
be found in an international study (pp. 317-18). It was found that violence generally
declined after targeted killings were carried out (p. 318). Furthermore, after targeted
killings occur, there is a drop in the number of sophisticated attacks (such as suicide
bombings and IED attacks), whilst there is a rise in the number of unsophisticated attacks
(such as simple shootings) (p. 319). In addition, when sophisticated attacks are carried
out after a targeted killing occurs, there is a higher likelihood of the attack being
unsuccessful (p. 319). Thus, Wilner‟s work provides evidence in favor of the
effectiveness of targeted killings.
Thus, it becomes apparent from such case studies that a key issue in the study of
the effectiveness of targeted killings is the examination of retaliatory attacks by terrorist
groups. The first question is whether one should gauge the effectiveness of targeted
killings by taking into account the number of retaliatory attacks, or if one should
examine the number of causalities generated in retaliatory attacks. The second question
is whether one should control for the types of attacks which are carried out before and
after targeted killings, or if one should focus on the number of casualties in attacks
before and after targeted killings. While this issue is as of yet to be resolved, it appears
that case studies have been the method of choice for calculating the effectiveness of
targeted killings.
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One unique study utilized quantitative methods to support the effectiveness of
targeted killings. Zussman and Zussman (2006), arguing that the Second Intifada has had
an extremely negative impact upon the Israeli economy, decided to compare changes in
the Israeli stock market index (the Tel Aviv 25 index) to the usage of targeted killings
(pp. 194, 198). Changes in the NASDAQ index were utilized as the control variable (p.
198). They also examine the influence of targeted killings on the Palestinian stock market
index (Al-Quds) (p. 202). They find that the Israeli and Palestinian markets reacted
“positively to assassination attempts targeting senior Palestinian military leaders,” but the
Palestinian market example was statistically insignificant (p. 203). However, the markets
responded negatively to the killings of high ranking Palestinian political leadership (p.
204). The authors conclude that the killing of military leaders is seen as an effective tool
of defense, but that the killing of political leaders is viewed as being harmful to Israeli
interests (pp. 204-205). However, it must be noted that while the authors report the Rsquare value in the tables, they do not speak of it in the text. The R-square for the
influence on the Israeli index was 0.08 while the corresponding Palestinian value was
0.06. This means that the influence of the independent variables of assassinations and
terrorist attacks only account for 8% of the changes in the Israeli index and 6% of
changes in the Palestinian index. Thus, while the authors provide an interesting model for
gauging the perceived effectiveness of the targeted killing program, their results do not
seem to be very supportive of their claims.
Jaeger and Paserman (2007) utilize a mixed methods research design, combining
formal modeling and a quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of Israel‟s targeted
killing program during the Second Intifada. The time scale of their analysis is from
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September 20, 2000 to January 15, 2005 (p. 8). The data sets utilized were taken from
B'Tselem and from Zussman and Zussman (2006) {mentioned below}(pp. 8-9). Jaeger
and Paserman create two measures of “intended Palestinian violence” {emphasis in
original} in order to address endogeneity concerns pertaining to targeted killings research
(pp. 9-10). The authors also mitigated endogeneity concerns by controlling for the
construction of the security fence separating the Israelis and Palestinians (p. 11). The
authors also separated the time period into distinct phases in order to control for changes
in the international and domestic political environments (pp. 10-11). They utilized OLS
for their calculations (p. 13). It was found that targeted killings killed the intended target
80% of the time (p. 12). Furthermore, the Israeli government carries out attacks in
response to successful suicide attacks (as opposed to unsuccessful attacks) (p. 15). It was
found that successful targeted killings had a statistically significant effect on lower the
effectiveness of Palestinian attacks (p. 18). However, after several weeks, the
effectiveness of Palestinian attacks begins to rise (p. 18). It was found that the killing of
Palestinian leaders decreased the number of successful Palestinian attacks (p. 22).
Interestingly, they also found that the influence of targeted killings upon Palestinian
attacks was “inverted-U shaped” (p. 22). Specifically, small numbers of attacks cause an
increase in Palestinian violence, whilst high levels of attacks cause a deterrent effect (p.
22). Thus, the authors provide empirical support for the effectiveness of targeted killings.
Hafez and Hatfield (2006) conduct a quantitative analysis of the effectiveness of
the Israeli targeted killing program during the Second Intifada (p. 2). The authors‟
timeframe for analysis was from September 29, 2000 to June 16, 2004 (p. 13). They
utilized news sources to code “successful attacks,” “foiled attacks,” “the number of
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Israelis killed and injured in Palestinian attacks,” the occasions on which the Israelis
utilized targeted killings and made military incursions, and “the number of Palestinians
killed and injured in Israeli counter-terrorism operations” (pp. 13-14). The scholars noted
that there were some issues concerning the accuracy of data (p. 14). While they
acknowledge that it may have lowered their number of cases, they erred on the side of
caution by excluding any ambiguous cases of which they were uncertain of either the
accuracy or veracity of the data (p. 14).
However, it must be noted that the authors seemed to betray their normative views
concerning Israel and targeted killings. They utilized loaded terms and language on
several occasions throughout the work in their description of the situation on the ground
and Israeli behavior. The authors utilized a multivariate approach in order to measure the
“interactions between predictive factors as well as their possible isolated affects” (ie.
determine which variables are interactive, purely independent, etc) (Hafez & Hatfield,
2006, p. 14). They note that linear regression did not “produce a model with significant
predictive power” (p. 14). Furthermore, they found that “many factors/models that were
found to be statistically significant were determined to have no practical explanatory
significance” (emphasis Hafez & Hatfield) (p. 15). The scholars found that the utilization
of targeted killings neither increases nor decreases terrorist attacks (pp. 21-23). Targeted
killings do not appear to deter attacks, do not result in “backlash” attacks, do not disrupt
terrorist operations, and do not seem to disrupt terrorist “resource endowments” (pp. 2123). The authors state that the results of their statistical analysis suggest that increased
defensive capabilities and intelligence capabilities may be the factors which have caused
the observed decrease in the “success rate” of terrorist attacks (p. 23).
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Only one study was found which adopted formal modeling as its method for
gauging the effectiveness of targeted killings (Jacobson & Kaplan, 2007). The authors
constructed a two period game in which both the terrorists and the government calculated
the best actions to take in response to each others‟ behavior (pp. 774-775). The Second
Intifada was utilized as the hypothetical context of their game. They found that targeted
killings (conducted in the first period) increase terrorist recruitment levels (p. 789).
However, it was found that if the government waited until after a terrorist attack occurred
(i.e. the second period) to execute a targeted killing, an optimal solution would be found
(p. 789). As the authors state, “the analysis in the present article is the first that suggests
circumstances under which hitting serves to maximize the number of (Palestinian plus
Israeli) civilian lives saved” (p. 789).
Radlauer (2006) utilizes rational choice theory from a criminology perspective for
examining manners in which governments may potentially deter terrorists (p. 609). In
rational choice theory, it is assumed that criminals are rational actors who weight the
costs and benefits of their actions (p. 609). Under this perspective, “if punishment is
swift, severe, and certain, few people will choose to disobey the law even if the potential
illicit gain is substantial” (p. 609). However, “if punishment is uncertain, slow, or
minimal, breaking the law can be seen as worthwhile even if the potential rewards are
modest” (p. 609).
In regards to applying this model to terrorism, the question is whether or not
terrorists are rational actors (Radlauer, 2006, p. 610). It is argued that since terrorism
includes the actions of individuals, groups, and communities, one must examine
deterrence from these three levels of analysis (pp. 610-11). It is argued that it is difficult
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to deter suicide terrorists (p. 611). For example, the Israelis have tried demolishing the
homes of the families of suicide bombers, but this has had no appreciable deterrent effect
(p. 611). It is argued that suicide terrorists think their families will be better off due to the
pensions provided by the Palestinian authority to the families of suicide bombers (p.
611). In addition, the demolitions appear to serve as positive propaganda for the
Palestinian terrorist groups (p. 611). Imprisonment of terrorists does not seem to have any
deterrent effect in the Israeli case either (pp. 611-12).
Radlauer (2006) argues that targeted killings should be an effective method of
deterrence, but that there are three hindrances to such a policy having a maximum
deterrent effect (p. 612). Firstly, the only way for a terrorist to cease being a target of a
targeted killing would be to cease being a terrorist altogether (p. 612). There would be no
way to deter against a particular attack (p. 612). Secondly, terrorists already live with a
high prospect of death in their work (p. 612). Finally, targeted killings are not carried out
consistently enough to convince terrorists that this would be the action a government
would definitely take against all terrorists in all contexts (p. 612).
However, whilst it is relatively difficult to deter individual terrorists, it would be
easier to deter an organization as a whole (Radlauer, 2006, p. 613). Specifically, the
killing of its leadership would be the most effective method, as demonstrated by the
Israeli case (p. 613). However, such a strategy is only effective if the entire leadership is
targeted and liquidated within a relatively short period of time (pp. 613-14). This
prevents an organization from simply promoting a well-seasoned terrorist to the top after
the killing of a single leader (p. 613). An example of this would the rapid, consecutive
Israeli targeted killings of the leadership of Hamas (p. 614). As Radlauer notes, “while
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Hamas has not disappeared or even renounced terrorism, the organization has behaved
much more cautiously since these killings than it did previously” (p. 614). However, it
must be noted that such a strategy seems to only be effective against centralized groups,
as opposed to decentralized groups (p. 614).
Kober (2007) works to examine the empirical effectiveness of targeted killings,
from the perspective of the debates between Warden and Pape in the 1990s regarding the
use of airpower as an effective instrument of decapitating leaders, and thus
“incapacitating the enemy” (p. 80). Warden believes it can be effective, whilst Pape
argues that it is not effective (p. 80). Rather, Pape believes that conventional combat is
the best method for success (p. 80). Kober focuses on the differences in effectiveness of
targeted killings on inhibiting as group‟s capabilities, when examining the killing of one
military leaders versus political leaders (pp. 81-82). With the Second Intifada as his
conflict case, and utilizing statistical and case study evidence, he finds that the killing of
political leaders of terrorist groups results in greater damage to the organization‟s
capabilities than does the killing of military leaders (pp. 81-86). For example, on several
occasions, Hamas has implemented unilateral ceasefires after the killing of its political
leadership, and on occasions when a specific threat of a targeted killing occurring was
issued by the Israeli government (pp. 85-86). However, he could not find a causal
relationship between the decline in the death toll in terrorist attacks and the use of
targeted killings (p. 86). Rather, he notes that the decline is also correlated with the
IDF‟s incursion and control of Palestinian areas and the building of the security barrier,
both of which could serve as reasons behind the decline (pp. 86-88). Thus, Kober‟s work
provides some interesting findings.
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Catignani (2008) examines changes in Israel Defense Force (IDF) operational
behavior and tactics during the Intifada (pp. 3-5). The IDF has placed the safety of its
troops first, even in situations in which increased aggressiveness may result in increased
negative coverage in the media (p. 5). It was also the IDF‟s view that if the Palestinians
were to believe that terrorism made them any gains whatsoever, it would encourage
further terrorism (pp. 6-7). Due to increased negative media coverage of targeted killings
which utilized missile attacks and airpower, the IDF began switching to more covert
targeted killings utilizing its special forces (p. 7). He finds that whilst the IDF was
tactically successful, some of its aggressive harmed Israeli political/strategic goals in the
end (p. 16). Catignani assists in advancing the field of knowledge concerning the
effectiveness of targeted killings by bringing in political variables into the context of
gauging such a program‟s effectiveness.
Honig (2008) provides a realist critique of the Israeli usage of targeted killings (p.
563). However, he neither argues against the use of targeted killings from a normative
perspective, nor does he critique them from an empirical perspective (p. 563). Rather, he
argues that current Israeli policy has resulted in “the sub-optimal use of the tool” (p. 563).
Honig argues that Israeli utilization of targeted killings has been “insufficiently
discriminate” in the following five dimensions: Firstly, he states that one must consider
“the political views and potential influence of the person killed” (2008, p. 564). Honig
argues that the Israelis have sometimes killed leaders who may have made better
negotiating partners than individuals such as Arafat, if they had been left alive instead of
being eliminated (pp. 564-65). Thus, one may gain a tactical edge, whilst committing a
strategic blunder.
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Secondly, one must take into consideration “the timing of the operation and the
possible political and strategic ramifications” (Honig, 2008, p. 564). He argues that the
Israelis have sometimes inadvertently placed tactical success over strategic outcomes (p.
565). For example, Israel has sometimes taken advantage of the tactical opportunity to
eliminate specific leaders, but this has sometimes led to the end of a ceasefire, and to the
detriment of the Israelis‟ image in the media (pp. 565-66). Hence, a state must take into
consideration how its actions may be portrayed in the media, because the media may be
used as a propaganda tool by the enemy.
Thirdly, one must be mindful of “the target‟s organizational affiliation, and the
operational capacities of this organization to retaliate” (Honig, 2008, p. 564). The Israelis
have not always taken into account the differing capabilities groups have, and thus the
differing levels of response each group could bring to bear on Israel, and the level
deterrence that Israel can bring to bear on each group (pp. 566-67). For example, it is
argued that Israel has a greater ability to deter and withstand responses from Hamas (a
local Palestinian terrorist group), than it can Hezbollah, an international terrorist group
funded by Iran (pp. 566-67). Finally, he argues that it is difficult to destroy terrorist
groups such as Hamas, because it is decentralized and it has become embedded in
Palestinian society (p. 571).
Fourthly, one must consider “the political context and potential domestic political
impact for the enemy” (p. 564). He argues that a targeted killing could sometimes be
harmful to Israeli interests, because such incidents could be utilized as propaganda for
extremists to utilize to outflank moderates in the Arab world (p. 567). The paradox faced
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by the Israelis is that by killing those that threaten their security, they may inadvertently
give an opportunity for the enemies of Israel to increase their own standing and political
capital, in order to outflank their domestic rivals.
Finally, one must take account of “the media profile given to the operation”
(Honig, 2008, p. 564). The scholar argues that Israel is not as discrete as it should be in
its utilization of targeted killings (p. 568). However, he notes that the Israelis have
attempted to reduce civilian casualties, which has been demonstrated by “consistent
preference {for} shooting the terrorists while in their vehicles, rather then {sic} targeting
their apartment buildings, where other innocent people may reside” (p. 564). .Honig
believes that a more discrete and secretive use of targeted killings would prevent Israel
from receiving the high level of negative media coverage it has been receiving during the
Second Intifada (pp. 568-69).
Honig argues that there are “three pathologies which characterize the Israeli
decision-making {process}” (p. 569). Firstly, there is a “military dominant organizational
culture” (p. 569). The military is the primary force in making decisions on when to utilize
targeted killings, with the diplomatic corps being essentially shut out of the process (pp.
569-70). The second issue is “a lack of deep historical awareness” (p. 570). Specifically,
it appears that the Israeli leadership is focusing primarily on short-term issues in the
decision-making process, rather than long term goals (p. 570). Finally, there is the socalled “hi-technology cult” (p. 570). Specifically, the IDF, like most militaries, has
become focused on the utilization of high tech weapons on the battlefield, as opposed to
more low tech solutions (p. 570). Thus, whilst targeted killings can be an effective
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solution to terrorism, Honig believes that the Israelis are not utilizing their abilities to
their optimal extent.
In regards to explicit examinations of issues related to methodology and targeted
killings, only one article was found in this literature review. Ben-Yehuda (1990),
operating from a sociologist‟s perspective, provides an overview of methodological
issues that came about during his examination of the history of targeted killings in Israel
(pp. 345-347). The author explains that one of the main issues in conducting such
research is the fact that much of the data is classified (p. 351). While officials
occasionally offered him access, it was explained that any potential project would
“undergo censorship,” which Ben-Yehuda believes to be “totally unacceptable” (p. 351).
Ben-Yehuda utilized a “socio-historical” approach which utilized both qualitative and
quantitative methods (p. 352). The qualitative methods mentioned consisted of standard
examinations of autobiographies, archives, newspapers, historical accounts, court
documents, and the conduction of interviews (pp. 352-356). The quantitative section
consisted solely of descriptive figures (p. 363). In regards to interviews, it was found that
the main issues were maintaining neutrality and a phenomenon they refer to as “dripping”
(pp. 355, 359). Essentially, “dripping” is a small leak whose purpose is to either frame a
particular event in a favorable light, or to provide false leads (pp. 359- 361). The author
concluded that he had “full information” for approximately 17% of all assassination cases
(p. 362). The author concludes by reexamining the aforementioned complications which
arise from conducting research into secretive practices.
As demonstrated, one can see that the empirical and methodological literature
concerning targeted killings has been relatively sparse, but is slowly beginning to grow.
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However, in order to resolve the issue of the lack of empirical data, scholars first need to
adopt a strong methodological frameworks for research. Successful empirical
examinations into the effectiveness of targeted killings must be both interdisciplinary and
utilize mixed methods. Pure quantitative, qualitative, and game theory designs, while
useful, cannot take into account the “truth” of the issue. Alone, each method can only
provide a small portion of the whole picture. If academics take such actions, empirical
research into the effectiveness of targeted killings will be much more fruitful in the
future.
Conclusion
As one can see, there has been no lack of research into targeted killings. In fact,
there are four main ways in which future research can build upon and improve the
existing literature. Firstly, historians must begin delving into examinations of targeted
killing programs against non-state actors, rather than focusing on cases of political
assassination. Secondly, historians can improve the literature through utilizing process
tracing methods, rather than supplying their readers with encyclopedic entries of cases of
individuals whom have been targeted. Thirdly, normative examinations of the morality of
targeted killings must move beyond the hegemonic framework of pure Just War Theory.
Fourthly, legal theorists must free themselves from the bondage of the law enforcement
versus law of war debate which has arisen due to the legal ambiguity of terrorism under
international law. Rather, jurists must work to develop new legal frameworks to offer for
adoption by the international community. Finally, scholars must create interdisciplinary
and mixed-methods based research designs for examining the empirical effectiveness of
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targeted killings. In conclusion, the study of targeted killings will likely prove to be a
fruitful field of work for the years to come.

Chapter 4: Research Design and Methods
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Whilst much of the debates concerning the utilization of targeted killings have
focused on normative and legal perspectives, there has been a veritable dearth of research
concerning the whether or not such tactics are actually effective in fighting terrorism
(Morehouse, 2009). Hence, this study attempts to rectify this situation through the
provision of both a quantitative and qualitative examination of the effectiveness of the
United States‟ targeted killing program. This chapter is divided into three main parts. The
first portion outlines the quantitative research design. The second part of this chapter
explains that qualitative approach utilized in this study. The final portion of this chapter
provides a conclusion.
The Quantitative Data
In regards to the United States‟ targeted killing program, my research preliminary
found that there was a lack of a dataset comparable to that of the Israelis. However, in
early 2010, Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann of the New America Foundation
released a dataset of US-conducted predator drone strikes in Pakistan, which covers the
years 2004-2010. Whilst said dataset is expertly made and comprehensive in its intended
scope, it does not serve as a total record of US-conducted targeted killings. Specifically,
the dataset does not cover targeted killings conducted in states other than Pakistan. US
targeted killings have been conducted in places as diverse as Afghanistan and Somalia.
Furthermore, the dataset solely focuses upon strikes conducted by predator drones. The
US has used tactics that include attacks by AC-130 gunships and special operations strike
teams. Hence, there is a need for a comprehensive dataset of all US initiated targeted
killings, regardless of the tactic utilized or the country in which the attack occurred.
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This study‟s dataset was created in the following manner 2. The Lexis-Nexis
Academic archives were culled for news reports concerning occurrences of USconducted targeted killings. The time period under observation in the search was from
January 1st 2000 to May of 2010. The following terms were utilized as search terms in
this exercise: “targeted killing,” “predator drone,” “drone attack,” and “drone strike.”
The data sources searched within the Lexis-Nexis archive were the Associated Press, the
Global Broadcast Database, and the BBC Monitoring Service. It was found that the BBC
had the most comprehensive amount of information on the subject matter. Each targeted
killing incident found was recorded, including the number of terrorists killed and the
number of civilians killed. If there was a disparity in the number of dead between reports,
the chronologically latest report figures were always chosen. In instances in which there
was an estimate of dead, the highest figures were always chosen. This data was
aggregated on the weekly level, utilizing the timetables of broadcasting calendars. The
time period included in the final dataset was 2004-2009.
For purposes of comparison, the data from the NAF dataset was added to the
dataset created for this study, for the purposes of comparison (Bergen & Tiedemann,
2011). The NAF data on targeted killing incidents, the number of terrorists killed, and the
number of civilians killed in each attack was included. This data was aggregated on the
weekly level. The time period under observation was 2004-2009.
The data measuring the numbers of terrorist attacks, and fatalities from terrorist
attacks, comes from the Worldwide Incidents Tracking Systems (WITS) provided by the
United States government (NCTC, 2011). This data service provides statistics on all
terrorist attacks conducted worldwide since 2004. The data utilized included the dates of
2

Replication sets may be obtained from the author. Please email morehousema1@huskers.unl.edu.
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incidents and the number of deaths from each attack. This data was aggregated on the
weekly level. The time period under observation was 2004-2009.
This study tests the following Hypotheses:
H1: An increase in the number of targeted killings will lead to a decrease in the
number of terrorist attacks.
H2: An increase in the number of targeted killings will lead to a decrease in the
number of individuals killed in terrorist attacks.
This study utilizes the following Dependent Variables:
DV1: The total number of terrorist attacks carried out (per week) in the theater of
operations under observation (Afghanistan and Pakistan combined). This data
comes from the total number of attacks per week, as culled from the WITS data
for the aforementioned states. The time period under observation is 2004-2009.
DV2: The total number of fatalities in terrorist attacks (per week) in the theater of
operations under observation (Afghanistan and Pakistan combined). This data
comes from the total number of fatalities per week, as culled from the WITS data
for the aforementioned states. The time period under observation is 2004-2009.
This study utilizes the following Independent Variable:
IV1: The number of targeted killings carried out (per week) by the United States
in the theater of operations, per the Morehouse dataset. The time period under
observation is 2004 to 2009. This variable is lagged by one week.
IV2: The number of targeted killings carried out (per week) by the United States
in the theater of operations, per the NAF dataset. The time period under
observation is 2004 to 2009. This variable is lagged by one week.
This study utilizes the following Control Variables:
C1: The season of the year in which the targeted killing was carried out. This
variable will serve as a proxy for weather. It is possible that changes in weather
and seasons could influence the number of terrorist attacks carried out. It is
coded at the weekly level in the same manner as the rest of the dataset.
C2: Ramadan. This is included to see if the month of Ramadan has an influence
on the number of terrorist attacks carried out. It is possible that terrorist attacks
may be less likely to be carried out during Ramadan, than during other months,
due to Muslim religious observances.
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C3: The President of the United States. This variable measures whether or not the
person residing in the White House has an influence upon the number of terrorist
attacks carried out in the theater of operations.
The statistical portion of this study consists of two parts. The first part consists of
basic descriptive statistics, utilizing simple crosstabulations. The second portion consists
of statistical tests, utilizing linear regression.
The Qualitative Data
A qualitative examination of the effectiveness of the US program is also carried
out. Specifically, this is carried out through a case study of the data available concerning
terrorist behavior in the wake of targeted killings, in order to see what impact (if any) that
targeted killing operations have on terrorist behavior. Data for this portion of the study
consists of news reports, official announcements, and other documentation concerning
the perceived effectiveness of the program and examples of said program influencing the
behavior of terrorist leaders. The data for this part was culled from both the Lexis-Nexis
Academic archives and Google searches conducted in the course of collecting data for the
quantitative portion of this study. Additional examples were drawn for references found
within the literature reviewed for this study. Hence, this section of the study takes a
decidedly interpretivist stance in order to garner non-quantifiable empirical knowledge.
Conclusion
In summary, this study attempts to empirically examine the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the American targeted killing program. Towards this end, this study
carries out the first quantitative examination of the effectiveness of the United States‟
targeted killing program during the years 2004 to 2009. Furthermore, this study provides
a qualitative examination of the effectiveness of targeted killings. In the following
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chapters, it shall become apparent that there are conflicting results between the
quantitative and qualitative data.
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Chapter 5: The Quantitative Evidence
This chapter provides an examination of the statistical findings pertaining to
targeted killings conducting in the combined Afghanistan-Pakistan theater of operations
during the years 2004 to 2009. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first
portion of this chapter provides an overview of the descriptive statistics calculated in the
course of this study. The second part of this chapter presents the results of the linear
regressions ran for the purposes of gauging the effectiveness of targeted killings. The
final section of this chapter consists of an examination of the findings and a conclusion.
The Descriptive Data
As one can seen below (see Table 1), during the 2004 to 2009 time period, there
was a total of 74 weeks in which targeted killings occurred. This means that, during the
period under observation, targeted killings occurred during approximately 30% of weeks.
Number of Weeks in which Targeted Killings Occurred: 2004-2009
Table 1
YEAR
2004
TK?

Total

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Total

Yes

1

2

2

5

28

36

74

No

52

51

51

48

25

17

244

53

53

53

53

53

53
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However, it also becomes apparent that the targeted killing program saw a massive
increase in operational weeks during the last year of the Bush administration, and the first
year of the Obama administration. Hence, the years 2008 and 2009 marked a period of
transition in the program, in that these two years were the first time in which the majority
of weeks saw targeted killings carried out. Thus, targeted killings occurred in
approximately 52% of the weeks of the year, whilst in 2009 targeted killing occurred in
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approximately 67% of the weeks of the year. Furthermore, one can also see that the first
year of the Obama administration saw an approximately 15% rise in operational weeks,
compared to the last year of the Bush administration. Finally, when one takes into
account the actual number of attacks per year, one again sees a dramatic increase in the
number of strikes carried out in the years 2008 and 2009 (see Table 2). In summary, it
appears that the US has increased its utilization of targeted killings during the period
under observation.

Table 2
Morehouse
NAF

Number of Targeted Killings: 2004-2009
(Sorted by
Dataset)
2004
2005
2006
2007
0
1
1
3
1
2
1
4

2008
47
34

2009
52
52

Unsurprisingly, the number of terrorists killed in targeted killings has increased in
tandem with the increase in the number of such operations being carried out (see Tables 3
and 4). Taking into account the numbers of targeted killings provided below, it appears

Morehouse
NAF

Number of Terrorists Killed Per Year: 2004-2009
(Sorted by
Dataset)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
0
1
5
35
264
4
6
5
67
180

Table 4
Morehouse
NAF

Mean Number of terrorists Killed per Targeted Killing: 2004-2009
(Sorted by
Dataset)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009 Total
0
1
5
11.6
5.6
7.9
6.9
4
3
5
16.75
5.2
9.6
8.1

Table 3

2009 Total
415
720
504
766

that targeted killings are a relatively efficient method of killing terrorists. For example,
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taking the Morehouse figures into account, there were 104 targeted killings and 720
terrorist deaths in the 2004-2009 period. This averages out to approximately 7 terrorist
deaths per strike over the 2004-2009 period (see Table 4). The NAF figures provide an
average of 8.1 terrorists killed per strike during the same period.
An examination of the data suggests that that the level of civilian casualties
generated by targeted killings is clouded (see Table 5). For example, the Morehouse

Table 5
Morehouse
NAF

Number of Civilians Killed in Targeted Killings: 2004-2009
(Sorted by
Dataset)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009 Total
0
0
13
0
46
23
82
0
0
5
4
169
218
396

data finds that a total of 82 civilians were killed during the course of targeted killings
from 2004 to 2009. On the other hand, the NAF figures show that 396 civilians were
killed during targeted killings during the same period. Hence, the Morehouse data finds
that the average number of civilian deaths per targeted killing was 0.7 during the period
under observation, whilst the NAF numbers show an average of 7.6 deaths per strike (see
Table 6). Thus, the NAF figures show an average of civilian deaths that is 10 times that

Table 6
Morehouse
NAF

Mean Number of Civilians Killed per Targeted Killing: 2004-2009
(Sorted by
Dataset)
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009 Total
0
0
13
0
0.9
0.4
0.7
0
0
5
4
4.9
4.1
7.6

of the Morehouse dataset. Furthermore, in regards to the total number of civilian deaths
during the 2004-2009 period, it becomes apparent that the NAF dataset codes over 4
times as many civilian deaths than does the Morehouse dataset. The questions are how
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such a disparity was generated in the first place, and if such a disparity influences this
study‟s calculations concerning the effectiveness of targeted killings.
In regards to the first question, this study takes the position that the differences in
the totals of civilian casualties must be the result of the differing sources utilized in the
course of the creation of the two datasets. These two datasets did not utilize all of the
same sources of information, and thus differences should be of no surprise. For example,
some sources may report higher numbers, whilst others may report lower figures.
Furthermore, some sources may report more attacks than others. Thus, differences in
figures should come as no surprise.
On the topic of the second question, this study holds that the discrepancy found in
the level of civilian casualties between the two datasets should be of no strong concern.
Whilst any collateral damage is saddening, when one takes into consideration both sets of
figures, the numbers of civilian deaths are relatively low. This is especially true if one
were to compare civilian casualties in targeted killings to conventional aerial
bombardments conducted during general wars, such as World War Two. In addition,
there is a concern over the how differing news organizations are determining who is a
civilian and who is a terrorist. A perusal of the source notes from the Morehouse dataset
and the NAF would highlight that these very issues were encountered by those who
worked on both datasets. Finally, since the number of civilian deaths in targeted killings
is not calculated in the linear regressions ran in this study, the disparities outlined above
should not cause much methodological concern.
Targeted Killings and the Presidents
As one can see below (see Table 7), there is some interesting data concerning
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trends in the number of operational weeks during the Bush and Obama administrations. It
Weeks in Which targeted Killings Occurred, by
Administration: 2004-2009
Table 7
US President
Bush
Targeted Yes
Killing?

No

Total

Obama

Total

40

34

74

228

16

244

268

50

318

appears that during the course of the entire Bush administration, 40 targeted killings were
carried out in theater. However, the first year of the Obama administration saw a total of
34 operational weeks, 6 operational weeks shy of the total for the previous 5 years. One
can also from the data (See Table 8) that the total number of targeted killings conducted

Table 8

Morehouse
NAF

Total Number of Targeted Killings, by
Administration: 2004-2009
(Sorted by Dataset)
Bush
Obama
29
26 Total
33
33 Total

during the first year of the Obama administration was, depending on the data source,
near-equal or equal with the total number of targeted killings carried out by the Bush
administration. Taking these two facts into account, one may hazard to guess that both
the Bush and Obama administrations appear to believe targeted killings to be an effective
strategy for combating terrorism. Considering that said administrations would be privy to
much more information pertaining to the effectiveness of targeted killings, than would be
available to a common academic, it is arguable that both presidents would hold a
relatively strong grasp of the relative merits of such operations. Hence, if either president
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believed that targeted killings were ineffective (according to the data available to them),
one would logically hold that either (or both) presidents would discontinue (or limit) such
operations. However, since both administrations have increased the utilization of targeted
killing operations, compared to previous years, then it would be logical to believe that
both presidents have viewed targeted killings to be an effective strategy for combating
terrorism.
Targeted Killings and Ramadan
As one can see below (see Tables 9-10), the United States is not inhibited from
Weeks in which Targeted Killings Occurred: 2004-2009
(Sorted by Weeks Running Concurrent with Ramadan)

Ramadan?

Table 9

Yes
Targeted Yes
Killing?

No

Total

No

Total

9

65

74

21

223

244

30

288

318

Number of Targeted Killings During Ramadan: 2004-2009
Table
10
Bush
Morehouse
NAF

(Sorted by Administration and Dataset)
Obama
Total
13
6
19
18
5
23

carrying out targeted killings during the month of Ramadan. The US carried out targeted
killings during 9 of the 30 (total) weeks of Ramadan during the years 2004 to 2009.
Hence, 30% of the weeks of Ramadan during the six-year period saw at least one targeted
killing operation. Thus, it is apparent that the US is willing to carry out targeted killings
during Ramadan. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that both the Bush and Obama
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administrations are willing to conduct targeted killing operations during Ramadan (see
Table 10). Thus, the US government, regardless of administration, seems to be prepared
to carry out targeted killings year round, even during Ramadan.
Targeted Killings and the Seasons of the Year
As one can see below the United States has carried out targeted killings during all
seasons of the year, during the 2004-2009 period (see Table 11). However, it also appears
Weeks in which targeted Killings Occurred, by Season: 2004-2009

Season

Table 11
Spring

Summer

Fall

Winter

Total

Targeted Yes

13

21

24

16

74

Killing?

67

59

53

65

244

80

80

77

81

318

No

Total

that the majority of the weeks which saw targeted killings occurred in the Summer and
Fall seasons of the year. Thus, it appears that targeted killing operations are carried out
continuously throughout the year, with a potential bias in favor of the Summer and Fall
seasons.
Concerning Terrorist Attacks
Since 2004, there has been a dramatic and steady increase in the number of
terrorist attacks carried out in the theater of operations (see Table 12). In fact, according
Number of Terrorist Attacks and Fatalities per
Year: 2004-2009
Table
12
Terrorist Attacks
Fatalities

2004
303
561

2005
931
1025

2006
1335
1588

2007
2012
3273

2008
3072
4282

2009 Total
4042
11695
5449
16178

to this study‟s dataset, there has only been one week during the period under observation
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in which no terrorist attacks were carried out in the region. The week in question was the
11th week of 2004. The increase in the yearly total of attacks has been dramatic. For
example, there were 303 terrorist attacks in 2004, compared to 4,042 attacks in 2009.
This means that there was more than a 13-fold increase in the number of terrorist attacks
between 2004 and 2009. In addition, the number of fatalities from terrorist attacks has
increased alongside with the increases in terrorist attack incidents. For example, there
were 561 fatalities from terrorist attacks in 2004, whilst by 2009 this figure reached a
total of 5,449. This represents an almost 10-fold increase in the number of fatalities from
terrorist attacks in theater from 2004 to 2009. Furthermore, taking into account that there
was only one week since 2004 in which there was no terrorist attack carried out, it
becomes apparent that the terrorists conduct their operations year-round, and therefore
are not necessarily hindered by changes in seasonal weather conditions. In addition, it is
interesting to note that the terrorists were consistently willing to carry out attacks during
Ramadan during the 2004-2009 period (see Table 13). There were terrorist attacks carried
Table
13

Weeks in which terrorist Attacks were Carried out During Ramadan
Attack
Ramadan

No Attack
30

0 Total

out during every single week of Ramadan during the period under observation. Hence, it
becomes apparent that the terrorists are still very much active in the region. Furthermore,
it appears that the terrorists are unconcerned with drawing the ire of their fellow Muslims
for conducting attacks during the month of Ramadan.
Conclusions Regarding the Descriptive Data
Several interesting conclusions may be drawn from the descriptive statistics
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uncovered in the course of this study. There are six main findings in this study
concerning targeted killings and terrorist attacks. Firstly, targeted killing operations have
gone from a relatively rare tactic during the 2004 to 2007 period, to become a relatively
frequent tactic in the 2008 to 2009 period. In fact, over half of the weeks during both
2008 and 2009 saw at least one targeted killing strike carried out in theater. Secondly, it
appears that targeted killings are effective at killing terrorists with an average of 6.9 to
8.1 terrorists being killed per strike (depending on the dataset). Thirdly, it is difficult to
discern the true number of civilians being killed during the course of targeted killing
strikes. The average number of civilian deaths per strike varies between 0.7 and 7.6,
depending upon the data source. Thus, it appears that research focusing specifically upon
divining the number of civilians killed in such strikes, and the methodological issues with
conducting such a study, would be of merit in its own right. Fourthly, it appears that both
the Bush and Obama administrations must view targeted killings as being an effective
strategy for killing terrorists, considering that there was a marked increase in the number
of attacks in the last year of the Bush administration, and the first year of the Obama
administration. Furthermore, both administrations have proven themselves capable of
allowing strikes to be carried out during Ramadan. Fifthly, the US carries out targeted
killings year-round, with a slight preference being detected for the summer and fall
months. Finally, it becomes apparent that the terrorists conduct their attacks year-round,
with only one week since 2004 not seeing a terrorist attack. In addition, the number of
fatalities has increased during the period. Furthermore, terrorists do not seem to fear
retribution from their fellow Muslims for carrying out attacks during Ramadan. In
conclusion, one can see than many valuable findings can come forth from descriptive
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found in the data generated for this study.
The Statistical Results
The bstatistical testseveral linear regressions were ran. As one will remember
from the previous chapter, the independent variables in each regression were lagged by
one week. Furthermore, it must be noted that SPSS was the statistical program utilized in
the regressions for this study, and thus all tests of significance are two-tailed.
The Morehouse Dataset Findings
The first regression ran measured the influence of targeted killings (lagged by one
week) upon the number of terrorist attacks (in the week following the targeted killing)
(See Tables 14-16). The variables for Ramadan, US president, and season were added as
controls in the regression. The R-square value of the model was .464, meaning that
46.4% of the variation in the number of terrorist attacks per week is explained by the
variables entered into this model. The B coefficients for this regression found several
Table 14. Regression 1: Model Summaryb
Std. Error of the
Model
1

R

R Square
.681a

.464

Adjusted R Square
.457

Estimate
20.196

a. Predictors: (Constant), NUMTKLAG, SEAS, RAM, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMTAT

interesting results. For the lagged targeted killing variable, it was found that for every
one-unit increase in targeted killings per week, there was an increase of over 5 terrorist
attacks in the following week. This result was statistically significant, with the p-value
being .000. However, the scatter plot for this model shows that there is an outlier, which
was the 51st week of 2009, in which 11 targeted killings occurred. In regards to the
seasonal variable, it appears that the further into the year the season under observation is,
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there are approximately 3 less targeted killings per week. This variable is statistically
significant, with the p-value being .003. The results for the Ramadan were statistically
insignificant, with the p-value equaling .586. Finally, the presidential variable suggests
that, under the Obama administration, it was likely that there would be an increase of 43
terrorist attacks per week compared to the Bush administration. This variable was
statistically significant, with the p-value being .000.
b

Table 15. Regression 1: ANOVA
Model

Sum of Squares

1 Regression

df

109959.917

Mean Square

4

Residual

127263.218 312

Total

237223.136 316

F

Sig.

27489.979 67.395 .000a
407.895

a. Predictors: (Constant), NUMTKLAG, SEAS, RAM, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMTAT

Table 16. Regression 1: Coefficientsa

Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

95.0% Confidence

Coefficients

Coefficients

Interval for B

B

1 (Constant)

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig.

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

-3.326

8.882

-.375 .708

-20.802

14.149

SEAS

-3.092

1.017

-.127 -3.040 .003

-5.094

-1.091

RAM

-2.129

3.902

-.023

-.546 .586

-9.806

5.548

PRES

43.270

3.271

.577 13.230 .000

36.835

49.706

5.773

1.243

.204

3.328

8.218

NUMTKLAG

4.646 .000

a. Dependent Variable: NUMTAT

A second regression was run, in which the sole change from the previous model
was in the dependent variable. In this model, the number of fatalities in terrorist attacks
served as the dependent variable (See Tables 17-19). In this case, the R-square for the
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model was .326, meaning that 32.6% of the variation of the dependent variable was
explained by changes in the independent variables under observation. Several interesting
observations can be made from these data. For example, the lagged targeted killing model
found that for every one-unit increase in targeted killings in a week resulted in
approximately 8 more fatalities from terrorist attacks in the following week. This variable
Table 17. Regression 2: Model Summaryb

Model

R

Std. Error of the

Square

Estimate

R Square
a

1

Adjusted R

.571

.326

.317

36.838

a. Predictors: (Constant), NUMTKLAG, SEAS, RAM, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMFAT

Table 18. Regression 2: ANOVA
Sum of
Model
1

Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

204592.833

4

Residual

423391.785

312

Total

627984.618

316

F

Sig.
a

51148.208 37.691 .000
1357.025

a. Predictors: (Constant), NUMTKLAG, SEAS, RAM, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMFAT

Table 19. Regression 2: Coefficients

Model
1

Unstandardized

Standardized

95.0% Confidence

Coefficients

Coefficients

Interval for B

B

Std. Error

Beta

Lower

Upper
Bound

t

Sig.

Bound

(Constant)

11.495

16.200

.710

.478

-20.380

43.371

SEAS

-3.753

1.855

-.095 -2.023

.044

-7.403

-.102

RAM

-11.028

7.117

-.073 -1.550

.122

-25.031

2.974

PRES

58.073

5.966

.476

9.735

.000

46.335

69.811

8.178

2.267

.178

3.608

.000

3.718

12.638

NUMTKLAG

a. Dependent Variable: NUMFAT
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was statistically significant, with a p-value of .000. However, as in the previous model,
the incident in which there were 11 targeted killings in the 51st week of 2009 serves as an
outlier once more. Again, the seasonal variable was statistically significant, with every
increase in the season of the year correlating with a decrease of approximately 3 fatalities
in terrorist attacks per week. This variable was statistically significant, with a p-value of
.044. The Ramadan variable was again statistically insignificant, with a p-value of .122.
The presidential variable found that, under the Obama administration, there was likely to
be approximately 58 more fatalities from terrorist attacks per week, than under the Bush
administration. This variable was statistically significant, with a p-value of .000.
Due to the discovery of an outlier event in the lagged targeted killings variable, a
dummy variable was inserted in the model. The regression from above was run again,
with the number of terrorist attacks per week again serving as the dependent variable (See
Tables 20-22). The R-square for this model was .427, meaning that 42.7 percent of the
Table 20. Regression 3: Model Summaryb
Std. Error of the
Model
1

R

R Square
.654a

.427

Adjusted R Square
.420

Estimate
20.891

a. Predictors: (Constant), DUMMYTKLAG, RAM, SEAS, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMTAT

variation in the dependent variable was explained by the independent variables in the
equation. In regards to the lagged dummy targeted killing variable, it was found that for
every one-unit increase in targeted killings per week, there was an increase of
approximately 5 terrorist attacks in the following week. However, this variable was
statistically insignificant, with the p-value equaling .797. The seasonal variable showed
that there was a decrease in approximately 2 terrorist attacks per week, the further the
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season was into the year. This variable remained statistically significant, with the p-value
being .008. The Ramadan variable remained statistically insignificant, with its p-value
equaling .312. Finally, the presidential variable showed that, under the Obama
administration, there was likely to be approximately 48 more terrorist attacks per week
than under the Bush administration. This variable was statistically significant, with the pvalue being .000.
b

Table 21. Regression 3: ANOVA
Model

Sum of Squares

1 Regression

df

101902.792

Mean Square

4

Residual

136604.356 313

Total

238507.148 317

F

Sig.

25475.698 58.372 .000a
436.436

a. Predictors: (Constant), DUMMYTKLAG, RAM, SEAS, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMTAT

Table 22. Regression 3: Coefficientsa

Model

Unstandardized

Standardized

95.0% Confidence

Coefficients

Coefficients

Interval for B

B

1 (Constant)

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig.

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

-3.915

9.220

-.425 .671

-22.055

14.225

SEAS

-2.794

1.049

-.115 -2.664 .008

-4.857

-.730

RAM

-4.064

4.016

-.043 -1.012 .312

-11.966

3.837

PRES

47.877

3.250

.636 14.731 .000

41.482

54.271

5.466

21.178

-36.204

47.136

DUMMYTKLAG

.011

.258 .797

a. Dependent Variable: NUMTAT

The dummy lagged targeted killing variable was again added to the model from
above. In this model, the dependent variable was the number of fatalities from terrorist
attacks per week (See Tables 23-25). The R-square for this model was .300, meaning that
30% of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables
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Table 23. Regression 4: Model Summaryb
Std. Error of the
Model

R

R Square
.548a

1

Adjusted R Square

.300

Estimate

.291

37.552

a. Predictors: (Constant), DUMMYTKLAG, RAM, SEAS, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMFAT

in the model. In regards to the lagged dummy targeted killing variable, it was found that
for every one-unit increase in targeted killings per week, there was a decrease of
approximately 30 fatalities from terrorist attacks in the following week. However, this
Table 24. Regression 4: ANOVAb
Sum of
Model
1 Regression

Squares
189202.363

df

Mean Square

4

47300.591

Residual

441378.605 313

1410.155

Total

630580.969 317

F
33.543

Sig.
.000a

a. Predictors: (Constant), DUMMYTKLAG, RAM, SEAS, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMFAT

Table 25. Regression 4: Coefficients

Model
1 (Constant)

Unstandardized

Standardized

95.0% Confidence

Coefficients

Coefficients

Interval for B

B

Std. Error

Beta

t

Sig.

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

9.181

16.572

.554 .580

-23.426

41.788

SEAS

-3.180

1.885

-.080 -1.687 .093

-6.889

.529

RAM

-13.600

7.219

-.089 -1.884 .060

-27.804

.603

PRES

65.376

5.842

.534 11.191 .000

53.882

76.870

-30.012

38.069

-104.915

44.890

DUMMYTKLAG

-.038

-.788 .431

a. Dependent Variable: NUMFAT

variable is statistically insignificant, with a p-value of .431. The seasonal variable found
that the further into the year that the season is, there is a decrease of approximately 3
fatalities from terrorist attacks per week. Whilst this variable was statistically
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insignificant at the p=.05 level, it was statistically significant at the p=.10 level. The
Ramadan variable was again statistically insignificant at the p=.05 level. The presidential
variable showed that, under the Obama administration, there were would be
approximately 65 more fatalities from terrorist attacks per week, than there were under
the Bush administration. This variable was statistically significant at the p=.05 level.
The data outlined above provide several interesting findings. In depth-discussion
on the consequences of these findings are left for the conclusion. Firstly, it appears that
the number of terrorist attacks and number of fatalities from terrorist attacks is somewhat
influenced by the time of year. Since the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities
consistently decreases as the year progresses, it appears that terrorist behavior is
influenced by such factors. Secondly, it appears that Ramadan has no influence upon the
number of terrorist attacks and fatalities from terrorist attacks. Thirdly, it appears that
terrorist attacks and fatalities from terrorist attacks are more likely to happen under the
Obama administration than under the Bush administration. Finally, it appears that
increases in the number of targeted killings result in increases in both the numbers of
terrorist attacks and the numbers of fatalities from such attacks.
The New America Foundation Data Findings
The first regression ran measured the influence of targeted killings (lagged by one
week) upon the number of terrorist attacks (in the week following the targeted killing)
(See Tables 26-28). The variables for Ramadan, US president, and season were added a
controls in the regression. The R-square for this model was .468, meaning that 46.8% of
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by changes in the independent
variables in the model. In regards to the lagged NAF targeted killing variable, for every
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b

Table 26. Regression 5: Model Summary
Model

R

R Square

.684a

1

Adjusted R Square

.468

Std. Error of the Estimate

.462

20.103

a. Predictors: (Constant), NAFTKLAG, SEAS, RAM, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMTAT
Table 27. Regression 5: ANOVAb
Model
1

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

Regression

111132.107

4

27783.027

Residual

126091.029

312

404.138

Total

237223.136

316

F

Sig.

68.746

.000a

a. Predictors: (Constant), NAFTKLAG, SEAS, RAM, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMTAT

Table 28. Regression 5: Coefficientsa
Unstandardized

Standardized

95.0% Confidence

Coefficients

Coefficients

Interval for B

Beta

t

Sig.

Upper

Bound

Bound

Model

B

1 (Constant)

-.596

8.871

-.067 .946

-18.050

16.858

SEAS

-2.753

1.009

-.113 -2.729 .007

-4.737

-.768

RAM

-2.539

3.875

-.027

-.655 .513

-10.163

5.084

PRES

40.045

3.481

.534 11.504 .000

33.196

46.894

9.650

1.942

.231

5.828

13.472

NAFTKLAG

Std. Error

Lower

4.968 .000

a. Dependent Variable: NUMTAT

one-unit increase in the number of targeted killings per week, there was an increase of
approximately 9 terrorist attacks in the following week. This variable was statistically
significant at the p=.05 level. The seasonal variable showed a decrease of approximately
2 terrorist attacks per week, as the seasons of the year progressed. This was statistically
significant at the p=.05 level. The Ramadan variable was statistically insignificant, with
its p-value equaling .513. The presidential variable found that there were approximately
50 more terrorist attacks per week under the Obama administration than there were under

80
the Bush administration. This variable was statistically significant at the p=.05 level.
A second regression was run on this model, with the sole change being the
dependent variable (See Tables 29-31). In this equation, the dependent variable was the
Table 29. Regression 6: Model Summaryb
Std. Error of the
Model

R

R Square
.578a

1

Adjusted R Square

.334

Estimate

.325

36.620

a. Predictors: (Constant), NAFTKLAG, SEAS, RAM, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMFAT

Table 30. Regression 6: ANOVAb
Sum of
Model

Squares

1 Regression

209590.085

df

Mean Square

F

4

52397.521

Residual

418394.534 312

1341.008

Total

627984.618 316

39.073

Sig.
.000a

a. Predictors: (Constant), NAFTKLAG, SEAS, RAM, PRES
b. Dependent Variable: NUMFAT

Table 31. Regression 6: Coefficients

Model
1 (Constant)
SEAS

a

Unstandardized

Standardized

95.0% Confidence

Coefficients

Coefficients

Interval for B

B

Std. Error

15.706

16.159

-3.278

1.837

Beta

t

-.083

Sig.

Lower

Upper

Bound

Bound

.972 .332

-16.088

47.500

- .075

-6.893

.337

-25.369

2.405

1.784
RAM

-11.482

7.058

-.076

- .105
1.627

PRES

52.791

6.341

.432 8.326 .000

40.315

65.267

NAFTKLAG

14.545

3.538

.214 4.111 .000

7.583

21.506

a. Dependent Variable: NUMFAT

number of fatalities from terrorist attacks per week. The R-square for this model was
.334, meaning that 33.4% of the variation in the dependent variable was explained by
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changes in the independent variables in this model. In regards to the lagged NAF targeted
killing variable, it was found that for every one-unit increase in the number of targeted
killings per week, there was an increase of approximately 14 fatalities from terrorist
attacks in the following week. This variable was statistically significant at the p=.01
level. The seasonal variable shows that as the seasons of the progressed, there was a
decrease of approximately 3 fatalities per week from terrorist attacks. This variable was
statistically insignificant at the p=.05 level, but was statistically significant at the p=.10
level. The Ramadan variable was again statistically insignificant, with its p-value
equaling .105. The presidential variable suggests that, under the Obama administration,
there were approximately 52 more fatalities from terrorist attacks per week than under the
Bush administration. This variable was statistically significant at the p=.01 level.
Several interesting findings come forth from the results of the lagged NAF
targeted killing variable. In-depth discussion of their implications shall be reserved for
the conclusion. Interestingly, the NAF variable findings lend support to those of the
Morehouse dataset. Firstly, it appears that the season of the year has somewhat of an
influence on terrorist activity. Secondly, Ramadan again has no apparent influence on
terrorist operations. Thirdly, it appears that terrorist attacks and terrorist attack fatalities
are at an increased chance of occurring under the Obama administration, compared to the
Bush administration. Finally, it again appears that increases in the number of targeted
killings are correlated with increases in both the number of terrorist attacks and the
number of fatalities from terrorist attacks.
Conclusion
As one can see, there are many interesting observations which can be made
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concerning targeted killings. Firstly, it appears that the number of terrorist attacks and
number of fatalities from terrorist attacks is somewhat influenced by the time of year,
under the findings of both the Morehouse and NAF data. Hence, it may be that seasons
and weather could influence terrorists‟ operational planning. Furthermore, this finding is
consistent with the well-known strategy of insurgents in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region
commencing their offensives in the springtime. Secondly, it appears that Ramadan has no
influence upon the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities from terrorist attacks,
regardless of the targeted killing data utilized. This suggests that the Ramadan holiday
has no influence whatsoever upon terrorist activities. Thus, military planners and security
officials would be wise to not allow themselves to be caught off-guard during Ramadan
by believing that terrorism would be less likely to occur during a religious holiday
celebrated by the terrorists. To do otherwise would be to commit the same mistake as the
United States did immediately prior to the Tet Offensive, by believing that the North
Vietnamese would hold to a truce during the Buddhist holiday. Thirdly, it appears that
terrorist attacks and fatalities from terrorist attacks are more likely to happen under the
Obama administration than under the Bush administration, under both sources of targeted
killing data. However, this result could be spurious, further testing is called for on this
variable. Finally, it appears that increases in the number of targeted killings result in
increases in both the numbers of terrorist attacks and the numbers of fatalities from such
attacks, under both targeted killing datasets. Thus, it appears that targeted killings do not
have an influence upon the ability of terrorist groups to carry out attacks in theater.
However, the question remains if targeted killings could impact terrorist group behavior
in some other manner. This question is answered in the following chapter.
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Chapter 6: The Qualitative Evidence
This chapter examines the qualitative evidence pertaining to the effectiveness of
the United States‟ targeted killing program. It is herein argued that the qualitative
evidence available suggests that the United States‟ targeted killing program is effective in
hindering the operations pof terrorist organizations. This chapter is divided into three
main sections. The first section argues against the utilization of terrorist recruitment
levels as a variable, explaining that it is a problematic variable for gauging the
effectiveness of a targeted killing program. The second section of this chapter presents
the empirical data pertaining to the effectiveness of targeted killings. The final section of
this chapter consists of a conclusion and analysis of the findings of the qualitative data.
Is Terrorist Recruitment an Appropriate Variable?
A critical question one must ask in formulating a qualitative method for gauging
the effectiveness of targeted killings is if terrorist recruitment should serve as a variable.
Specifically, should the possibility of there being a positive (or negative, or inverse)
relationship between targeted killings and terrorist recruitment levels be taken into
account in a qualitative model? Whilst some may argue that this should be the case, this
study takes the position that such a variable would be difficult to accurately account for
in a qualitative (or, quantitative, for that matter) model. At issue is the ability for one to
properly measure what the level/volume of terrorist recruitment would have been in the
absence of targeted killings. One could not honestly argue that targeted killings cause an
increase (or decrease) in terrorist recruitment levels unless one would know what would
otherwise have occurred in terrorist recruitment.
The construction of such a model would present great difficulties for a researcher.
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Firstly, it would be nigh impossible for one to obtain the actual data pertaining to
recruitment numbers over time from a terrorist group.
Secondly, if one were to hypothetically obtain accurate information on this topic,
how would one be able to determine what was the cause of changes in recruitment levels
over time? One could not simply assume that changes in recruitment levels were solely
determined by changes in the number of targeted killings. Factors such as the territory
controlled by coalition forces, the territory controlled by militants, the methods which the
militants utilize for their recruitment drives, the economic situation in the states in which
militant groups are operating, etcetera could all or in part each account for variations in
terrorist recruitment numbers over time. One could not accurately measure the influence
of targeted killings upon terrorist recruitment unless one knew exactly why recruits
joined terrorist groups, and it is unlikely that such groups issue surveys their recruits,
with it being further unlikely that one could find such data if it did in fact exist.
Thirdly, one would be wise to not take potential statements by terrorist groups at
face value, regarding their recruitment levels. It would be in the best interests of terrorist
groups to inflate their recruitment numbers in the first place, for propaganda purposes. It
would not serve the terrorists‟ cause to state that their recruitment numbers were falling.
So, regardless of the existence of targeted killings, it would be logical for terrorist groups
to claim that they had high/increasing recruitment numbers in the first place.
Furthermore, official terrorist statements regarding the influence of targeted killings upon
recruitment levels would be suspect. If recruitment levels were falling due to targeted
killings, why would the terrorists release such information, considering that it could be a
sign of weakness which could further lower their recruitment levels? Would not the
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interests of the militants be served best by stating that targeted killings were increasing
their recruitment numbers? How could one determine which was the truth? If it were true,
then it would mean that the targeted killing program may be ineffective in the long run.
However, if the program were effective, would it not be in the best interest of the
terrorists to claim that the program was causing more recruits to join their cause?
Finally, one would question the appropriateness of measuring the effectiveness of
targeted killings, by measuring the impact of targeted killings upon terrorist recruitment.
Specifically, the issue is over what the targeted killing program itself is supposed to
achieve. As one would recall from the previous chapters of this work, the United States‟
program attempts to hinder terrorist operations through the targeting of the leadership of
such organizations, not specifically through the targeting of common members. Hence,
attempts to measure the effectiveness of targeted killing levels through the measurement
of changes in terrorist recruitment levels would be of questionable utility. To do as such
would be akin to gauging the impact of the Lincoln assassination upon the United States
government by measuring US Army recruitment levels before and after Lincoln‟s
assassination. Therefore, since the purpose of the program is to eliminate the leadership
of terrorist groups, the most logical course of action would be to examine the impact that
targeted killings have upon the leadership and operations of such groups.
The Evidence
In order to gauge the empirical effectiveness of targeted killings, one must first
determine what would qualify as evidence of the effectiveness of targeted killings, and
what would demonstrate that targeted killings were ineffective. Towards this end, this
study argues the following concerning targeted killings. If targeted killings are effective,
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the qualitative data must provide evidence that targeted killings have caused terrorist
groups to change their tactics, organizational structure, etcetera. If targeted killings are
ineffective, then the qualitative data should not have any hint that targeted killings have
caused any discernable change in the tactics, organizational structure, etcetera of terrorist
groups. This section will take such factors into account, and examine the data observed
from the three models of behavior outlined earlier in this chapter. However, before
proceeding, it must be noted that a qualitative examination of terrorist behavior does
carry with it certain limitations. Specifically, the issue is the lack of depth in the
qualitative data available concerning terrorist operations. It would not really be feasible
for a scholar from a Western university to conduct fieldwork with a terrorist organization.
Neither is it likely for a terrorist group‟s records to suddenly become readily obtainable to
members of the public. Considering this, news reports serve as the primary, readily
available source for qualitative data on terrorist group behavior. Hence, at the present
time, a qualitative assessment of the effectiveness of targeted killings serves as a basic
triangulation/approximation of terrorist behavior in the face of targeted killings. This
chapter attempts to carry out such an assessment.
There has been some evidence that the US targeted killing program has had an
effect upon the behavior of terrorist leaders, from the perspective of viewing terrorist
groups as unitary actors under the Rational Actor Model (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). For
example, in a newspaper article printed in the Pakistani paper The Nation in April of
2009, it was stated that the US program was causing terrorist leaders to change the
location of their respective headquarters (Shahid, 2009 April 30). The author of the story
relates that “Taleban leaders after discussing in detail the situation, caused by recent
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threats of drone attacks by the United States, United Kingdom and other allies, had
decided to vacate Quetta with immediate effect” (par. 1). Furthermore, it was also found
that the “majority of the top leaders have shifted to Karachi, Peshawar and other areas of
Pakistan and are now living in a low profile” (par. 2). Pakistani police officials have
stated that it is hard to keep track of militants within the cities (Guerin, 2010 June 22).
The United States‟ drone program has continued to influence the behavior of the
militants. For example, strikes conducted by the CIA have been driving the militants out
of North Waziristan (Wright & Tohid, 2010 November 5, par. 1-4). As a result of the
increase in drone strikes, Taliban forces appear to be “dispersing” to other tribal regions
of Pakistan (par. 4). Interestingly, the region to which a great deal of the Taliban forces
are moving is one which has historically seen few drone strikes (par. 11).
These data suggest that the possibility of being killed in a targeted killing is
perceived by terrorist leaders as being a real danger to themselves. Furthermore, this data
demonstrates that in the calculations of the terrorist groups, it is a safer course of action
to go into major cities, thus placing themselves at an increased risk of detection and arrest
from the security forces, than it is to stay in the countryside and risk being killed in a
targeted killing. In summary, the abovementioned information lends support to the
argument that targeted killings hamper the operations of terrorist groups, from a Rational
Actor Model perspective. This would be so, due to the fact that no seemed to be no
disagreement among the terrorists on the decision, since the organizations were presented
as unitary actors in the article above.
It appears that there are pre-existing tensions between local fighters and foreign
fighters, which could become exacerbated by targeted killings. It has been noted that

88
there is a split within the Taliban concerning the strong influence which Al-Qaeda holds
in the tribal regions of Pakistan (Khan, 2007 March 7, par. 17). Al-Qaeda members in the
region, mainly consisting of Arabs, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, have not hesitated to demonstrate
their influence in the area, even resorting to killing locals who were seen as obstacles to
their goals/power in the region (par. 17-39). Such tensions have led to intra-militant
violence in the past (par. 31). In fact, in the fall of 2006 a conflict almost erupted among
the militants in the area over who would become the region‟s Taliban commander (par.
32). Conflict was only averted due to the direct intervention of Taliban leader Mullah
Dadullah (par. 33). In 2007, open conflict erupted between the local and foreign fighters
in the aforementioned region (BBC, 2007 March 21, par. 1). Thus, it is arguable that
there is a possibility that targeted killings may prove capable of exacerbating the tensions
between different terrorist organizations.
Hence, it appears that both the Organizational Behavior and Governmental
Politics models of examining behavior seem to be applicable in this case (Allison &
Zelikow, 1999). For example, in the wake of the death of Taliban commander Baitullah
Mehsud, rifts began to form in the midst of the Taliban in Pakistan (Dai, 2009 August 26,
par. 1). His death was also linked with the defection of several Pashtun tribes from the
Taliban (par. 1). Furthermore, Mehsud was an Al-Qaeda ally, and his death harmed the
organization‟s access to support and resources in the area (par. 2-4). Mehsud had assisted
Al-Qaeda in acquiring bases and training facilities for their international activities (par.
4). Thus, his death could been seen as hindering Al-Qaeda‟s international activities. Just
days after the killing of Mehsud, over 70 Taliban members had been killed in intraTaliban fighting (The Nation, 2009 August 14, par. 1-3). In fact, a Taliban meeting was
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held two days after Mehsud‟s death, for the purpose of picking a new leader (Hussain &
Page, 2009 August 10, par. 1-2). At the meeting, a verbal conflict over leadership turned
violent, leading to the death of one and the severe injury of another one of the men whom
aspired to fill Mehsud‟s place in the Taliban leadership (par. 3). It was also reported that
both Al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban representatives were attempting to act as mediators in
order to prevent infighting, but that they were unsuccessful at stopping the eruption of
intra-Taliban violence (par. 8). In the wake of Mehsud‟s death, Taliban members also
became concerned over the possibility of an informant existing “in their midst,” due to
the fact that the US had placed a $5 million reward up to the one who provided
information leading to the capture of Mehsud (Qayum & Rupert, 2009 August 10).
There are several key findings that flow forth from this data. Firstly, the data
demonstrates, consistent with the expectations of the Organizational Behavior Models,
the terrorists of Afghanistan and Pakistan can by no means be considered to be a unitary
actor. The fact that conflict can erupt between allied organizations such as the Taliban
and Al-Qaeda, and even within the same organization (ie. the Taliban), suggests that said
groups are not as united as they are commonly believed to be, and that their behavior may
be best explained as the result of inter-organizational (and intra-organizational) conflicts.
Secondly, it appears that, consistent with the Governmental Politics Model, that group
behavior can be the result of internal dynamics within the group. An example of this
would be the deaths and injuries that were the result of the conflict over who would take
over the regional leadership position after the death of Mehsud. Hence, decisions within
the Taliban do not appear to necessarily be governed by rational calculations, as much as
they are by the outcomes of internal political battles. Finally, the data suggests that
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targeted killings can be an effective tool for combating terrorism, but from an oblique
perspective. Specifically, this case may be suggestive that the targeting of the mid-level
leadership of a terrorist organization may be the most effective course of action for states
to take, as opposed to mainly targeting the top leadership of a group. The death of a
regional commander, such as the abovementioned case of Mehsud, can lead to internal
squabbles over leadership within a group, with a great chance for intra-group (and intergroup) violence to be the result. Hence, states can harm terrorists by setting into motion
situations which would likely lead towards terrorists targeting focus (and weapons)
towards each other.
It appears that the terrorists themselves consider the loss of members of its
leadership to be potentially dangerous to the cohesion of their subsidiary units.
Journalists Zahid Hussain and Jeremy Page have noted that intelligence analysts have
found a trend among militants in the region denying the veracity of reports of the deaths
of their leaders in order to prevent dissension and fights over power from developing
within the ranks (2009 August 10, par. 20). The risks of internal conflict over leadership
are not solely based upon personality conflicts, but also upon pre-existing intra-militant
conflicts (Tufail, 2009 February 12). Furthermore, infighting is not limited to just the
Pakistani Taliban. There are examples of violent clashes among portions of the Afghani
Taliban (Afghan Islamic Press, 2008 April 12). Some of such conflicts have taken the
form of leadership conflicts (Afghan Islamic Press, 2008 April 12). Other intra-Taliban
conflicts have taken the form of conflicts over resources, such as the collection of taxes
from farmers (National Afghanistan TV, 2007 September 14; Roggio, 2010 March 6).
Examples of the terrorists‟ fears coming to fruition include the deaths of Taliban
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commanders Mullah Dedullah and Akhtar Mohammad Osmani. After their deaths, the
Taliban became concerned over the potential presence of spies within their organization
(Ross, 2007 May 17, par. 1-2). It was learned by Taliban leaders that Taliban members
close to the aforementioned targets passed on the location of their whereabouts to the
United States government (par. 2-12). It appears that the fear of spies exists within the
Taliban on both the Afghani and Pakistani sides of the border, with executions of
suspects occurring on a fairly regular basis (par. 13). Furthermore, concerns over spies
have begun to create “tension” within the echelons of the Taliban, with even heretofore
“trusted men” falling under suspicion (par. 14). Hence, it again appears that the use of
targeted killings can assist states in combating their enemies through creating paranoia
within the organization in the wake of a targeted killing.
Finally, it appears that targeted killings can have an influence upon changes in
terrorist group organization and strategies. For example, after the killing of Mullah
Dadullah, the Taliban leadership began to make changes to the group‟s command
structure and strategies (Shahzad, 2007 August 11, par. 12-15). The first new rule was
that henceforth “no members of the central military command would work in
southwestern Afghanistan” (par. 15). The second stipulation was that command, control,
and strategizing would be devolved to the district-level “group commanders” (par. 15).
Official district-level strategies would only be passed one from the “group commander”
to his regional Taliban “governor,” who would then pass it on solely to the central
military command (par. 15). The central command would use this information in order to
“develop a broader strategy for particular regions” (par. 15). Thirdly, “the Taliban would
discourage personality cults like Dadullah‟s, as the death of a „hero‟ demoralized his
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followers” (par. 15). Finally, the Taliban devolved its media contact structure, by
dividing it among four separate regional representatives (par. 15). This was done as a way
to prevent the volume of information disclosed in the media representative were to be
captured (par. 15). These data suggest that the leadership of the terrorist groups must
consider targeted killings, and their aftermath, to be a credible threat to the efficacy of
their organizations.
Conclusion
Taking the qualitative data in its totality, it appears that the United States‟ targeted
killing program is effective at hindering the effectiveness of terrorist groups. Firstly, the
threat of targeted killings has caused the terrorist groups in Pakistan to disperse their
members across several provinces. Secondly, the threat of targeted killings has caused
terrorist leaders to take refuge in the larger cities of Pakistan, where they believe
themselves safe from the risk of US drone attacks. This is particularly telling, considering
that moving into a major city could place said terrorist leaders at greater risk of arrest
from Pakistani authorities. Thirdly, targeted killings have lead to the creation of power
vacuums, which in turn have lead to intra-terrorist conflicts over leadership. Fourthly,
targeted killings have caused members of terrorist groups to become paranoid, thinking
that even their most trusted comrades may be informants. Finally, targeted killings have
caused terrorist groups to change their organizational structures and tactics in order to
better withstand the occurrence of targeted killings.
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Conclusion: Effectiveness is what Scholars make of it
As one can see, the topic of targeted killings is a wellspring for research. Whilst
one may argue that there is contradictory information concerning the effectiveness of
targeted killings, this chapter holds that these seemingly disparate findings can indeed be
synthesized. Furthermore, the results of this study provide a wealth of information
pertaining to topics such as research methods, avenues of future research, and
government policy. Towards this end, this chapter consists of four parts. The first section
contains a synthesis and evaluation of the quantitative and qualitative results of this
study. The second portion of this chapter addresses methodological issues pertaining to
targeted killings research, and potential areas of future research. The third part provides
policy recommendations concerning the United States‟ targeted killing program. The
final section provides a conclusion to this study.
Thoughts on the Evidence
At first look, one may argue that the quantitative and qualitative findings of this
study are contradictory. However, this is not necessarily the case. As one remembers, the
quantitative data found that increases in the number of targeted killings result in increases
in both the numbers of terrorist attacks and the numbers of fatalities from such attacks.
These results were statistically significant, utilizing both the Morehouse and NAF
datasets. Thus, it appears that targeted killings do not have an influence upon the ability
of terrorist groups to carry out attacks in Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
However, one is also reminded that the qualitative data has shown that there has
been a significant amount of evidence that the US targeted killing program has had a
hindering influence effect upon the operations of terrorist groups. Firstly, it was found
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that the fear of being killed in a targeted killing was causing terrorist leaders to change
the location of their respective headquarters to larger cities, believing that the US would
not carry out such attacks in major cities (Shahid, 2009 April 30). In addition, targeted
killings have caused the Taliban to “disperse” its members to other tribal regions of
Pakistan (Wright & Tohid, 2010 November 5). Furthermore, targeted killings have
created leadership vacuums, resulting in violent conflict among the terrorists in their
struggle for power (Dai, 2009 August 26). Also, targeted killings have caused the
terrorists to become paranoid about spies being in their midst (Qayum & Rupert, 2009
August 10; Ross, 2007 May 17). Finally, it appears that targeted killings can have an
influence upon changes in terrorist group organization and strategies (Shahzad, 2007
August 11).
Arguably, the difference in results is based upon the difference in the units of
analysis. The quantitative data examined the aggregate number of targeted killings,
compared to the aggregate number of terrorist attacks in theater; whilst the qualitative
data examined the influence of targeted killings on internal group behavior. Hence, it is
arguable that targeted killings are an effective method for combating terrorism for the
following reasons. Firstly, one must remember that the quantitative data only measured
terrorist attacks in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Whilst targeted killings may not have
lessened the number of attacks in theater, it is possible that targeted killing operations
have hindered the plans of terrorist groups to carry out their attacks internationally.
Secondly, it is impossible to know for sure if targeted killings are the actual cause of the
increase in the number of terrorist attacks in the region. One must remember that
correlation does not equal causation. In addition, one cannot know for sure what the
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baseline number of terrorist attacks would have been otherwise. Finally, targeted killings
are an effective strategy for combating terrorism, even if they have no influence on the
number of terrorist attacks. Rather, it is possible that their effectiveness exists in the
realm of the non-quantifiable. Specifically, the value of targeted killings could be found
in the hindering of ongoing operations; generating distrust and paranoia among allied
terrorists; causing leaders to move into cities where they may be at an increased risk of
capture; forcing groups to decentralize themselves, thereby increasing the risk of group
fragmentation and the creation of competing bases of power within the various
movements, etcetera. Hence, it is arguable, on the basis of the aforementioned qualitative
data, that targeted killings are an effective strategy for combating terrorism.
Concerning Methods and Future Research
As the preceding section has highlighted, targeted killings research is a
microcosm of the ongoing debates concerning the relative merits of quantitative versus
qualitative research. Arguably, empirical research into the effectiveness of targeted
killings highlights the need for mixed-methods research in the discipline. For example, if
one had solely relied on the quantitative data presented in this study, one would have
determined that targeted killings are an ineffective strategy for combating terrorism. On
the other hand, if one had solely relied on the qualitative data in this study, one would
have wrongly come to the conclusion that targeted killings are effective in hindering
terrorist operations in every conceivable way. But, through an examination of both
quantitative and qualitative data, one can gain a better, more balanced understanding of
the relative merits and effectiveness of the United States‟ targeted killing program.
Hence, research into targeted killings highlights the importance of mixed-methods
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research in the social sciences.
There are many avenues of fruitful research on targeted killings. Firstly, it would
be recommendable that a dataset be generated which would aggregate targeted killing and
terrorist attack data on the daily level. Secondly, an updated dataset should increase the
breadth of terrorist attack related variables from the WITS dataset. Specifically, the
variables related to injuries and hostages should be included in any future analysis.
Thirdly, an expanded dataset should attempt to code targeted killings and terrorist attacks
at the provincial level, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan individually. Fourthly, a variable
controlling for the numbers of NATO forces (and Pakistani forces) at the regional level
would be recommendable as well. Fifthly, any future qualitative analysis should include
on the ground interviews within the region, in order to gain a better understanding of how
targeted killings may be influencing the behavior of terrorist organizations. Obviously,
such interviews would not be conducted with actual terrorists. However, a good deal of
insight into their operations could be gleaned from individuals such as local government
officials, police officers, soldiers, local and international journalists, etcetera. Sixthly, the
qualitative data should be expanded upon to examine cases of US-conducted targeted
killings in places outside of the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, such as those which have
occurred in Somalia. Finally, a comparative study would be of great value, by comparing
the targeted killing programs conducted by other countries, which have received very
little attention. For example, both Russia and Colombia have conducted targeted killings
in recent years. In sum, a great deal of research could be made for years to come.
Policy Recommendation
In consideration of the evidence found during the course of this study, it is
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recommended that the United States government increase and geographically expand its
utilization of targeted killings for combating terrorism. Granted, the quantitative data
does demonstrate that increases in the number of targeted killings results in increases in
the numbers of terrorist attacks and the number of fatalities from such attacks. However,
one must also keep in mind that there has not been another major terrorist attack in the
United States since 9-11, and that targeted killings may have played a crucial role in
preventing such an occurrence. Furthermore, the qualitative data demonstrates that
targeted killings are deemed to be a threat to the terrorists‟ lives, at least in their own
minds. In addition, it has been demonstrated that targeted killings have hindered terrorist
operations in the past, having forced them to change standard operating procedures,
organizational structures, instigated power vacuums which have resulted in intra-group
conflicts, etcetera. Hence, base upon the evidence, it is recommended that the United
States government continue to utilize targeted killings, and to furthermore expand the
scope of its program.
Conclusion
The goal of this study was to rectify a major gap in the literature. Namely, the
dearth of empirical investigations into the effectiveness of the United States‟ targeted
killing program. This gap in the literature was not only a loss to the academic
community, but a problem for the policy community as well. Specifically, how could
policymakers logically argue in favor of continuing a program, if they had no idea if it
was even effective? Hence, this study attempts to provide a step towards filling this wide
gap in the literature, with hopes that this hole will someday be filled. In the meantime,
there is still much work to be done.
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